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ABSTRACT 
 
The regulation of market abuse is currently an ever evolving subject, to such an extent that it 
has been placed as a high priority for regulators worldwide.
1
 The Financial Markets Act 19 of 
2012 (FMA) of South Africa
2
 prohibits improper practices and is aimed at ensuring that 
market participants operate in a market that is free, safe and fair. In light of the above and as 
per example, all members of the stock exchange ensure that they accordingly adhere to the 
aims of the FMA by exercising functions such as due diligence and having a shared goal in  
embedding the values entrenched in the FMA.
3
 The purpose of this dissertation is aimed at 
assessing the key elements of the transformation process that the South African financial 
markets have embarked on, since the introduction of the FMA. More specifically, the paper 
aims to focus on the elements in relation to market abuse practices.
4
 The paper seeks to:  
1. provide an overview analysis of the current market abuse control enforcement 
framework in relation to some selected aspects of the financial markets in South 
Africa.  
2. look at the regulation employed in one of the biggest trading products namely, 
equities and current lacuna, the legislation that governs high frequency trading under 
these trading products and in general.  
3. review whether regulation in South Africa on market abuse practices are robust 
enough to deal with key market abuse practices such as insider trading and market 
manipulation that manifested during the recent global financial crisis.  
4. provide a comparative review of the current market leaders regulatory mechanisms on 
market abuse. 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
                                                          
1
 Regulators in question include inter alia The Financial Services Board, The South African Reserve Bank, the 
Financial Conduct Authority of the United Kingdom and the Securities Exchange Commission of the US.  
2
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. 
3
 Preamble of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. 
4
 S 78 – 81 of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The term market abuse became a commonly used term in South Africa after the advent of the 
Securities Services Act of 2004 and the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012.
5
 Market abuse 
covers improper trading practices relating to insider trading,
6
 prohibited trading practices 
such as market manipulation
7
 and the making of false, misleading or deceptive statements.
8
 
Market abuse control objectives were designed in order to compliment the twin peaks model 
of market conduct and prudential regulation as introduced by the Minister of Finance in the 
twin peaks model policy document aimed at regulating the financial sector, in order to make 
it a safer sector to serve South Africa better.
9
 Together with the Basel III 
10
 objectives and the 
King III Report on corporate governance, there was a need to ensure that the financial sector 
is armed in order to weather the storm of a crash in the market. It is submitted that a safer 
financial sector would reflect that South Africa‘s robust macro-economic fundamentals and 
financial regulatory framework would shield the sector against a drastic turn of events such as 
the global financial crisis.
11
 A contravention of the market abuse legislation provisions would 
invoke civil liability in the form of excessive fines or in light of criminal liability 
imprisonment, in the form of long prison sentences coupled with significant fines.
12
 
                                                          
 
6
 Section 78 of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. 
7
 Section 118 of the United Kingdom‘s Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 in relevant part states that 
market abuse is behaviour whether by one person alone or by two or more persons jointly or in concert— 
―(a) which occurs in relation to qualifying investments traded on a market to which this section applies; 
(b) which satisfies any one or more of the conditions set out in subsection (2); and 
(c) which is likely to be regarded by a regular user of that market who is aware of the behaviour as a 
failure on the part of the person or persons concerned to observe the standard of behaviour reasonably 
expected of a person in his or their position in relation to the market. 
. . .‖ 
8
 S 78 – 81 of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. 
9
 Minister of Finance Implementing a twin peaks model of financial regulation in South Africa (2013). 
10
 Basel III is a comprehensive set of reform measures, developed by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking sector. To mention a 
few, they are aimed at minimizing the probability of a recurrence of crises to greater extent; improving the 
banking sectors ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress; improving risk management 
and governance, and to strengthen banks transparency and disclosures . 
11
 Treasury, ‗Reviewing the regulation of Financial Markets in South Africa - Policy document explaining the 
Financial Markets Bill, 2011‘ available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FMB/FMB%20policy%20document.pdf (accessed on 20 May 
2014). 
12
 Treasury, ‗Reviewing the regulation of Financial Markets in South Africa  - Policy document explaining the 
Financial Markets Bill, 2011‘ available at 
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The regulatory framework governing the global markets arena and securities services is 
further strengthened and enhanced by a broader framework encompassing: 
1. The Companies Act 71 of 2008; 
2. Bank Acts regulations;  
3. The Financial Services Board Act No 97 of 1990;  
4. The Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act No 28 of 2001; and  
5. The Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. 
all of which reinforce the Registrar‘s regulatory and supervisory powers in respect of 
inspections, curatorship and other enforcement measures.
13
  
The Financial Services Board Act also provides individuals which are currently being 
regulated, the right of appeal against any decision made by the regulator. The Financial 
Services Ombuds Schemes Act allows for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for users 
of Self-Regulatory Organisations (SROs) and their clients.
14
 All of these mechanisms are 
aimed at ensuring that market abuse practices are carefully monitored and controlled in order 
to ensure that there is a safer financial sector which in turn compliments a safer economy 
where investors‘ interests are protected.15 
 
The enactment of the Financial Markets Act is a positive indication that the South African 
policy makers and Legislature acknowledged that a severe threat is posed by the effects of 
market abuse and that regular developments around market abuse regulation needed to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FMB/FMB%20policy%20document.pdf (accessed on 20 May 
2014). 
13
 Treasury, ‗Reviewing the regulation of Financial Markets in South Africa  - Policy document explaining the 
Financial Markets Bill, 2011‘ available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FMB/FMB%20policy%20document.pdf (accessed on 20 May 
2014). 
14
 Treasury, ‗Reviewing the regulation of Financial Markets in South Africa  - Policy document explaining the 
Financial Markets Bill, 2011‘ available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FMB/FMB%20policy%20document.pdf (accessed on 20 May 
2014). 
15
 Treasury, ‗Reviewing the regulation of Financial Markets in South Africa  - Policy document explaining the 
Financial Markets Bill, 2011‘ available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FMB/FMB%20policy%20document.pdf (accessed on 20 May 
2014). 
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maintained. Market abuse practices undermines investor confidence,
16
 it undermines the 
objectives of a free and fair market in which all customers are treated fairly. 
17
 
 
This research will determine and investigate whether the current legislative framework 
competently ensures that market abuse practices are well regulated and that it as far as 
possible effectively regulates prohibited trading practices such as insider trading, market 
manipulation and the making of false and misleading statements. The research conducted in 
this dissertation will focus on the gaps in the current legislative framework, which fails to 
provide guidance on the issue of high frequency trading in the equities market. This issue will 
be explored in more detail in Chapter 3.  
 
Chapter 3 will also highlight the existing technological developments that streamline trading 
practices in the equity market, and how these developments are continuously improved in 
contradistinction with the rule of law which remains static and unmodified to compliment or 
regulate the technological developments in accordance with the law. In order to ascertain 
whether the concerns highlighted above are valid, the following questions ought to be 
outlined and answered in this dissertation: 
1. Is the South African market abuse legislation adequate enough to ensure equity 
trading is efficient and well regulated? If not, what can be done to enhance or offer a 
solution to market abuse regulation? 
2. Is the South African market abuse legislation geared or designed in a manner to create 
an efficient market, in which investor confidence and standards are maintained. If not, 
what can be offered to enhance it? 
3. Comparatively, is the South African market abuse legislation aligned with 
international best practices such as those of the United Kingdom? 
4. Does the market abuse legislation serve as a mechanism to enhance international 
trading through the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE)? 
 
                                                          
16
 Treasury, ‗Reviewing the regulation of Financial Markets in South Africa  - Policy document explaining the 
Financial Markets Bill, 2011‘ available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FMB/FMB%20policy%20document.pdf (accessed on 20 May 
2014). 
17
 Treasury, ‗Reviewing the regulation of Financial Markets in South Africa  - Policy document explaining the 
Financial Markets Bill, 2011‘ available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FMB/FMB%20policy%20document.pdf (accessed on 20 May 
2014). 
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This paper therefore seeks to explore: 
1. the adequacy and effectiveness of market abuse legislation in the current day and age; 
2. the role of the regulator/s to ensure that controls are in place to combat market abuse;  
3. the various remedies available to aggrieved parties to a suit of an alleged market 
abuse practices investigated by the Financial Services Board (FSB).  
 
Chapter Four and Five of this dissertation will also provide a comparative analysis of the 
current legislative frameworks which pertain to market abuse and which are applied by the 
United Kingdom (―UK‖) and Nigeria. This analysis can potentially be used as a comparative 
tool to provide guidance and suggested measures to further develop the regulatory standards 
in place in South Africa and also provide guidance on the effectiveness and extent of South 
African legislation and how it can be potentially aligned to adjust to international best 
practice.  
 
The research is also aimed at providing a systemic framework for market abuse regulation. 
Borrowing from the United Kingdom and Nigeria, the comparative analysis will assist in 
enhancing and answering questions regarding how South Africa will keep abreast with the 
changes in activities within the equity markets, especially activities that have traces of 
financial crime and suspicious activities. The researcher believes that the paper will also 
serve to provide insight and guidelines on the regulatory interaction that should be 
maintained and followed into the future to ensure that South Africa never falls behind in 
regulating improper trading practices. 
 
1.2. BACKGROUND 
 
Financial markets can be defined as the institutional arrangements, mechanisms and 
conventions that exist for the issuing and trading - buying and selling of financial 
instruments.
18
 A financial market is not a single physical place but millions of participants, 
spread across the world and linked by vast telecommunications networks that bring together 
buyers and sellers of financial instruments and sets prices of those instruments in the 
                                                          
18
 Goodspeed I, ‗Introduction to Financial Markets - The South African Institute of Financial Markets‘ available 
at http://www.virtualexamcentre.co.za/saifm/downloads/files/Introduction_to_Financial_Markets.pdf  (accessed 
on 21 May 2014). 
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process.
19
 For every economy it is important to have a functioning and operative financial 
market wherein the interplay of trading activity is monitored, maintained and enhanced 
through governing rules and mechanisms. At the heart of each trading activity, the seller 
wishes to exchange a product in anticipation of receiving a payment for this either 
immediately or within a time period. However a corresponding obligation exists between 
these parties.  
 
In a perfect world the activity demonstrated above would occur free from any hindrance and, 
a client would receive the best price or deal and the seller would receive payment timeously 
and in the correct manner. To the contrary improper dealings can creep in and this type of 
practice is called a market abuse. Market abuse is a global problem that has adverse effects 
on emerging and developed markets.
20
 Failing to regulate such practices could lead to 
reputational and operational risks. It will affect any economy, undermine the integrity of the 
financial markets, as well as undermine the financial sector or any private sector, and 
undermine investor confidence.
21
  
 
1.3. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
1.3.1 AIM 
The thesis aims to provide a clear account of the market abuse regulative framework 
currently employed in South Africa. It aims to advocate for a safer and regulated financial 
market in which market abuse practices are efficiently and adequate controlled. It is aimed at 
providing ways to ensure that proper controls and measures are followed by all financial 
institutions in order to manage improper trading practices. In turn this will ensure that South   
Africa‘s legislation is in line with international best practices countries such as the United 
Kingdom and other market leaders in Africa such as Nigeria. 
 
1.3.2 OBJECTIVES 
It is important to identify the following objectives for the purposes of the research review 
conducted by the researcher: 
                                                          
19
 Goodspeed I, ‗Introduction to Financial Markets - The South African Institute of Financial Markets‘ available 
at http://www.virtualexamcentre.co.za/saifm/downloads/files/Introduction_to_Financial_Markets.pdf  (accessed 
on 21 May 2014). 
20
 Singh-Muchelle A, ‗MIFID, MMT and European Market Reform available at 
http://fixglobal.com/home/mifid-mmt-and-european-market-reform/ (accessed on 25 May 2014). 
21
 Singh-Muchelle A, ‗MIFID, MMT and European Market Reform available at 
http://fixglobal.com/home/mifid-mmt-and-european-market-reform/ (accessed on 25 May 2014). 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
a) To review and recommend better procedures in order to implement the market abuse 
regulations within South Africa. 
b) To review and recommend the deployment of more stringent fines and penalties for 
corporates and persons guilty of market abuse. 
c) To provide a recommendation for the implementation of specific legislation 
governing high frequency trading.
22
 
d) To recommend the deployment of  stricter sanctions for breaches of market abuse 
surveillance mechanisms employed by companies and brokers dealing on the 
securities markets. 
e) To recommend appropriate amendments to the Financial Markets Act to ensure that 
the provisions in the Act are more applicable to trade and prohibition on trading on all 
traded products. 
f) To encourage the regulators to employ stricter controls and mandates for companies 
to have internal controls in place to regulate market abuse and to control improper 
practices. 
 
1.4. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND HYPOTHESIS 
1.4.1 Problem Statement 
 
Market abuse poses grave threats to the confidence in the financial markets and the notion of 
free and fair investment through the trading platform.
23
 There is definitely a need to review 
the current scheme regulating this type of practice. Locally there are several investigations 
and cases that have been closed out and several pending on market abuse - either 
investigations into insider trading or market manipulate or more commonly known in South 
Africa as a prohibited trading practice.
24
 There are not many reports on instances of finding 
of insider trading and therefore it is appropriate to review the strengths and weaknesses of the 
regulatory universe of South Africa. The following problems identified require urgent 
remedial redress in order to ensure that our country is geared towards a freer and safer 
financial sector: 
                                                          
22
 High Frequency Trading (HFT) refers to a program trading platform that uses powerful computers to transact 
a large number of orders at very fast speeds. High-frequency trading uses complex algorithms to analyze 
multiple markets and execute orders based on market conditions. 
23‗Market abuse regime: Prioritisation and Proportionality‘ available at 
http://www.fsac.org.uk/library/communication (accessed on 27 July 2014). 
24
 Directorate of Market Abuse Past Investigations available at 
https://www.fsb.co.za/Departments/marketAbuse/Pages/pastInvestigations.aspx (accessed on 29 July 2014). 
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a) The current legislative framework adequately provides for the main market abuse 
practices identified internationally and provides a framework of adequate redress and 
recourses available to the aggrieved and imposes severe penalties and excessive 
prison sentences to abusers of the markets. There is however still a need to provide 
adequate rules that would address the concerns of effectiveness and appropriate 
sanctions for instances not covered such as the dawn of high frequency trading 
through algorithmic mechanisms that pose the threat of manipulating the market. Also 
deterrence has not always been appropriate measure to combat market abuse 
instances. 
b) There is a need to ensure that implementation and monitoring and surveillance 
measures are to be covered in the rule of law. More stringent provisions need to be 
incorporated into the legislation to force brokerages and dealers to employ market 
abuse regulations, guidelines and rules within the financial markets of South Africa. 
c) There should be constant reviews and developments around ensuring that the laws 
governing market abuse are designed in way to regulate over the counter trades that 
are not on an exchange and occurs on unregulated markets. The National Treasury of 
South Africa and international regulators have started to engage with market 
participants on this.  The South African National treasury published a Policy 
document
25
 regarding the regulations issued under the FMA. 
d) Another weakness prominent in South African market abuse legislation is that it fails 
to adequately provide for stringent rules that govern trade on dual listed stocks via the 
JSE and a foreign exchange. 
1.4.2 Hypothesis 
The following hypotheses are assumed in order to assist in the investigation into the 
regulation of market abuse in the South African financial markets: 
a) Although the legislative framework adequately provides for principles governing 
market abuse, there is a need for redress in order to meet the developmental demands 
of technology that has taken the forefront on automated trading on the financial 
markets arena. 
b) Ensuring that there is a legislative framework in place would not ensure that the 
processes are followed through efficiently. There is a need for stringent rules for 
                                                          
25
 Regulating Over-The-Counter (OTC) Derivatives Markets in South Africa: This policy document informs the 
proposed regulatory framework relating to the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market in South Africa and is 
drafted in accordance with s107(2)(iv) of the Financial Markets Act, No.19 of 2012 (FMA), effective 3 June 
2013. 
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enforcement purposes and also to make people aware of the effects of market abuse 
on the economy. 
c) Unregulated markets are also prone to market abuse; therefore redress in the 
legislative framework is a welcomed endeavour.  
d) Investment into South Africa is likely to assist and boost the country‘s economy. 
Heightening investor confidence and efficiency within the market, where the 
regulatory capabilities measure up to those of foreign jurisdiction, will add on to the 
emergence of our markets and growth prospects. 
 
1.5. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
This study will only review the current framework incorporated into the Financial 
Markets Act, together with the JSE directive on Market Abuse. The historic frameworks 
will be discussed in brief in order to provide background on the developments around the 
control of market abuse. This dissertation is only focused on one instrument which is the 
second largest exchange traded product, due to space and scope limitations the review of 
the equity market of South Africa will be clear and concise in order to capture the main 
ideas the author wishes to highlight for purposes of the study. The comparative review 
that will be discussed in detail in Chapters Four and Five respectively will only provide 
guidance and support for the recommendations identified. 
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
In light of the dangers that market abuse can pose to the financial and economic health of 
a state and moreover the global economy, it is important that the combat against market 
abuse should be a joint venture, whether continentally or globally. The fact that the 
current legislation does not adequately provide for worst case scenario market abuse 
practices is the reason for this research. Market efficiency, public investor confidence are 
important factors that drive growth and investment. In order to enhance the current 
framework the gaps and flaws need to be identified in order to minimize the effects of 
improper trading practices. This research will contribute to the awareness of the effects of 
market abuse, provide guidelines and recommendations to manage high frequency trading 
and advocate the need for more stringent provisions to govern market abuse. Unless these 
issues are appropriately reviewed, the emergence of market abuse will be felt for many 
more years and emerging markets like South Africa will suffer and fall by the wayside. 
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1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
For purposes of addressing the problems as highlighted and making appropriate 
recommendations for an effective insider trading regulatory framework in South Africa, 
the following research methods will be used. The researcher will refer to relevant 
academic writings on the topic of market abuse. There has not been a lot of research and 
investigation conducted on this topic.  The researcher will also make use of websites, 
seeing that this matter has not been researched in South Africa, a lot of the information 
will be based on lessons learnt from the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of 
America (USA), specifically the Securities Exchange Commission in USA and the 
Financial Conduct Authority in the UK. 
 
A number of libraries will be visited to access relevant books, case law, journals, statutes 
and other relevant materials. An examination and analysis of relevant case law and 
judicial precedents will be conducted. This research will focus on the Financial Markets 
Act 19 of 2012, Securities Services Act, 36 of 2004 and Insider Trading Act, 135 of 1998. 
Other relevant statutes from South Africa and other selected countries will be referred to 
for purposes of historical and comparative analysis. 
 
An historical analysis will also be followed in Chapter Two of this dissertation. The main 
objective is to investigate the evolution of insider trading legislation in South Africa and 
to compare it with the current provisions. The researcher will employ comparative studies 
between South African insider trading laws and those of selected countries that may have 
more effective regulatory frameworks in place, to learn from their experiences and for 
purposes of possible application in South Africa. 
 
1.8 STRUCTURE 
This paper consists of six chapters: 
1. Chapter 1 
This is the introductory part, which includes the definition of market abuse, provides a 
general background to market abuse, the research problem, the hypothesis, 
significance of the study and the methodology to be employed in the study. 
 
2. Chapter 2 
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The discussion will be centralised around the legislative developments on market 
abuse in South Africa. The discussion will review the important legislation and the 
idea around the developments. It will investigate the regulation on market abuse in the 
Insider Trading Act of 1998, the Securities Services Act of 2004 and the Financial 
Markets Act of 2012. 
 
3. Chapter 3 
This chapter examines the role the various role-players ought to fulfil in regulating the 
financial markets, but with a specific focus on the securities market in light of an ever 
growing sophistication around various trading practices that are constantly being 
introduced into this market. Emphasis will be placed on the fact that market 
participants fail to conduct an impact assessment or alignment to regulatory 
requirements. It will then focus on the regulation within the securities market in 
regard to the prevalent market abuse practices within this market. The author will 
introduce an ever evolving form of trading that traders are actively trading in that are 
not adequately regulated in South Africa, namely high frequency trading.  
 
4. Chapter 4 
This chapter will provide a comparative perspective of the regulation of market abuse 
in the United Kingdom and South Africa, for purposes of examining whether the 
integration of some of the UK market abuse principles into the South African 
regulatory framework has worsened or improved the regulation of insider trading in 
South Africa.  
 
5. Chapter 5 
Chapter Five provides a comparative analysis of the regulation of market abuse 
control in Nigeria and South Africa and investigates whether the South African 
legislature should not also have taken note of some developments in Nigeria. 
 
6. Chapter 6 
The final chapter comprises of recommendations, guidelines and conclusions to 
address the issue of market abuse in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS OF MARKET ABUSE REGULATION IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
As highlighted the integrity of South Africa‘s financial markets needs to be maintained, in 
order for investors to have confidence and for direct investment to flow into the country. This 
will be achieved through the proper regulation of market abuse. Discussions around this topic 
date back to the early nineties - however  the regulation of Insider Trading in South Africa 
was only promulgated in the Companies Act of 1973(Companies Act), which recognised it as 
a statutory offence.
26
 Insider trading was only recognised as a prohibited practice after the 
Van Wyk de Vries Commission of Inquiry into the Companies Act where it was confirmed 
that insider trading should be recognised as a malpractice.
27
 This Act was later amended on 
two occasions in order to address the lacuna.
28
 Even after these amendments, a gap in the law 
to deal effectively with the evil of insider trading remained.
29
  
It was in September 1995, that a task force namely the King Task Group was formed on the 
request of the Minister of Finance at the time, to delve into the issue of insider trading in an 
attempt to address the gaps in the South African financial markets regulation.
30
 The King 
Task Group recommended the enactment of a separate piece of legislation that would help to 
curtail the insider trading problem.
31
 The Insider Trading Act
32
 was enacted following the 
adoption by the legislature of the final King Report.
33
 
                                                          
26
 Insider trading regulation finds it origins in the Companies Act 61 of 1973. Section 233 of this Act was the 
founding provision which governed the prohibition on insider trading. This resulted in the adoption by the 
legislature of the various recommendations made by the Van Wyk de Vries Commission of Inquiry into the 
Companies Act in its Main Report.  
27
 Meskin P M (ed) Henochsberg on the Companies Act 4
 
ed (1985) 367.  See also Van Wyk de Vries Report 
paragraph 44.57. The Van Wyk de Vries Commission treated insider trading as a malpractice and a difficult 
problem that called for legislative intervention to combat its negative effects.  
28
 Companies Amendment Act 78 of 1989 and the Second Companies Amendment Act 60 of 1990. 
29
 Luiz SM ‗Insider Trading: A Transplant to Cure a Chronic Illness?‘ (1990) 2 SAMLJ 59. 
30
 The King Task Group and the King I Report. 
31
 The Report by the King Task Group. 
32
 Insider Trading Act 135 of 1998. 
33
 The Report by the King Task Group. See also Henning JJ and Du Toit S The regulation of false trading, 
market manipulation and insider dealing (2000) 25(2) Journal for Judicial Science 155 -163. There were 
generally gaps in this legislative development namely; a lack or no timeous settlement was recorded in civil 
cases. There was only one case reported for prosecution since the inception of the insider trading ban. Penalties 
were still significantly low, defences were inadequate and generally speaking its provisions still reflected several 
shortcomings. 
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The new act still did not adequately address the most crucial aspects of insider trading 
regulation and was repealed and replaced by the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004. After 
being in operation for close to ten years this Act too, was repealed and replaced by the 
Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. This law currently in operation is the governing legislation 
operative in South Africa and regulates market abuse. The Act covers insider trading, 
prohibited trading practices namely - market manipulation and the publishing of false and 
deceptive statements, the three main prohibited market abuse practices recognised globally.
34
    
2.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKET ABUSE - INSIDER TRADING 
REGULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA     
As part of this discussion the researcher aims to provide an overview of the scope of the Acts 
in relation to the scope of the guidelines and rules on prevention, detection, enforcement and 
regulation of these Acts.   
2.2.1. Van Wyk De Vries Commission Inquiry  
The Van Wyk de Vries Commission of Inquiry (Van Wyk Commission) treated insider 
trading as a malpractice and a difficult problem that called for legislative intervention to 
combat its negative effects.
35
 The Van Wyk Commission made the following conclusions and 
identified that insider trading activity is not only practised by directors, but also by officers, 
employees or other persons; and that insider trading takes place in South Africa although its 
extent is difficult to determine.
36
 
It is further submitted that insider trading is not limited to listed shares but also extended to 
other interests in a company and unlisted securities. In relation to unlisted securities it was 
discoursed that the identity of the parties is usually known and legislative intervention would 
not be necessary.
37
 While a director (as an insider) does not owe fiduciary duties to individual 
shareholders, any person who was in possession of inside information however, owed a 
positive duty of disclosure on the basis of the involuntary reliance on the part of the other 
party on such disclosure.
38
 
                                                          
34
 Chapter X of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. 
35
 Rider B & French L The Regulation of Insider Trading (1979). 
36
 Rider B & French L The Regulation of Insider Trading (1979). 
37
 Rider B & French L The Regulation of Insider Trading (1979). 
38
 Rider B & French L The Regulation of Insider Trading (1979). 
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The Commission found that different considerations applied to listed securities, because these 
transactions are anonymous and it was confirmed that, at that time, it was impossible for the 
JSE to identify the parties involved.
39
 It was concluded further that a civil remedy would not 
be feasible, but that insider trading in respect of listed shares should be made an offence with 
a substantial penalty.  
2.3 The Insider Trading Act of 1998 
 
In January 1999 new provisions regulating insider trading was introduced by the Insider 
Trading Act.
40
 Section 17 of this Act repealed section 440F of the Companies which 
previously regulated insider trading. 
41
 
 
The preamble to the Insider Trading Act of 1998 stated that the Act was enacted to prohibit 
individuals who have inside information relating to securities or financial instruments from 
dealing in such securities or financial instruments; to provide for criminal and civil law 
penalties for such dealing; to empower the FSB to investigate matters relating to such 
dealing, to institute proceedings in relation thereto and to administer the proof of claims and 
distribution of payments received as a result of any such proceedings; to establish the 
Directorate as a committee of the FSB for exercising the power to institute proceedings; to 
repeal a section of the Companies Act of 1973; and to provide for matters connected 
therewith.
42
The offences were listed in section two of this Act.
43
 
 
The first recognised offence covered persons who dealt directly or indirectly as an agent 
(client trading), for his or her own account or proprietary trading - on behalf of the company. 
Previously section 440F only provided for an instance where it will be an offence if someone 
dealt on a security on unpublished price sensitive information in respect of the security which 
they traded on whether acquired as a result of certain relationships or wrongful methods. This 
Act introduced an instance where prosecution no longer needed to show that the offender 
dealt on the basis of information. Prosecution only had to prove that the offender knew that 
                                                          
39
 Rider B & French L The Regulation of Insider Trading (1979). 
40
 Okpaluba C Defending the Regulation of Insider Trading on the Basis of Sound Legal Orthodoxy: The 
Fiduciary Obligations Theory, Law in Contemporary South African Society (2004) New Africa Books 303. See 
also SM Luiz ‗Insider Trading Regulation – If at First You Don‘t Succeed‘ (1999) 11 SAMLJ 136 at 138. 
41
 SM Luiz ‗Insider Trading Regulation – If at First You Don‘t Succeed‘ (1999) 11 SAMLJ 136 at 138. 
42
 Preamble to the Insider Trading Act 135 of 1998 (the Act). 
43
 Section 2 of the Act. 
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she was in possession of inside information
44
 and that she or he acted on this information and 
dealt in the relevant security. An accused could only escape liability if he or she proved that 
they were acting on inside information on behalf of a client, this would allow a broker to raise 
the defence that it was acting on the instruction of a client unless such information was 
disclosed to the broker prior to trading.
45
 
 
The second offence related to the encouraging or discouraging trading on the basis of inside 
information.
46
 It is now an offence for any person who knows that he or she has inside 
information to encourage or cause another person to deal or to discourage such a person from 
dealing in securities or financial instruments to which such information relates or which 
would likely be impacted by it.
47
 This was however only for the courts to adjudicate that the 
alleged conduct amounted to an encouragement or discouragement.
48
  
 
Improper disclosure or tipping-off was recognised as the third offence by the new Act. It 
recognised it as an offence where any individual who knows that he or she has inside 
information and discloses such information to another person.
49
 The individual could escape 
liability if he or she proved that on a balance of probabilities that the disclosure was made in 
the proper performance of their function in respect of their employment, office or profession 
and that such information was also disclosed as inside information.
50
 The individual could 
also prove that that they held the reasonable belief that no person would deal in the securities 
or financial instruments as a result of the disclosure.
51
  
 
The enforcement of insider trading laws in South Africa was generally difficult and can be 
viewed as an unsuccessful remedy in pursuit of punishing those guilty of the crime.
52
 South 
Africa was the first country to introduce civil remedies and in spite of all the efforts made by 
the legislature to enhance the enforcement thereof, it was still not effective enough. 
                                                          
44
 Section 1(vii) provided that ―inside information‖ means specific or precise information which has not 20 been 
made public and which- 
(a) is obtained or learned as an insider; and 
(b) if it were made public would be likely to have a material effect on the price or value of any securities or 
financial instrument; 
45
 Section 4 of the Act. 
46
 Section 4 of the Act.  
47
 Section 4 of the Act. 
48
 Section 4 of the Act. 
49
 Section 2(2) of the Act. 
50
 Section 4(2)(b). 
51
 Section 4(2)(a) of the Act. 
52
 The prosecution or civil claim success rate indicates that the Act was not that effective. 
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Our lawmakers should however not be faulted for its efforts to prohibit and improve the 
regulation of insider trading in its entirety. The author is of the view that the 1998 Act was a 
welcomed step in the right direction that paved the way to effective regulation for insider 
trading in South Africa and to address the widely putative belief that insider trading was an 
accepted practice in South Africa.  
 
2.4 The Stock Exchange Control Act 1 of 1985. 
 
Initially section 40 of the Stock Exchange Control Act
53
 regulated manipulative practices; 
however this section was substituted by section 37 of the Amendment Act of 1995
54
 and later 
substituted by the Amendment Act of 2001.
55
 The amendment of section 40 provided for the 
regulation regarding the prohibition on manipulative practices as well as price stabilisation.
56
 
 
There is however no evidence that this enactment was ever invoked in any prosecution of 
manipulative trading practices and that anyone was ever convicted of such a practice.  
 
2.5 Financial Markets Control Act 55 of 1989. 
 
This Act designated two sections to regulate market manipulation and false and deceptive 
statements which is now recognised as a market abuse practice. Section 20 covered false 
trading and market manipulation and section 21 regulated false or misleading statements. 
There is no indication in literature whether the Act was successful or not. 
 
2. 6 Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 
 
The Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (SSA) came into operation on 1 February 2005 
repealing the Stock Exchanges Control Act 1 of 1985, the Financial Markets Control Act 55 
of 1989, the Custody and Administration of Securities Act 85 of 1992, and the Insider 
                                                          
53
 Stock Exchanges Control Act 1 of 1985. 
54
 Stock Exchanges Control Amendment Act of 1995. 
55
 Stock Exchanges Control Amendment Act of 2001. 
56
 Section 40 of the Amendment Act. 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
Trading Act 135 of 1998 (the ‗ITA‘) and consolidated them into one measure.57 It amended 
the repealed laws in many important respects in order to correct and improve some of their 
provisions. In addition to this it added a significant number of new provisions to the previous 
measures.
58
 Chapter VIII of the Act regulated the broader offence of market abuse. 
59
The 
aims of the SSA were to enhance confidence in the South African financial markets by 
contributing to the maintenance of a stable financial market environment and by promoting 
the international competitiveness of securities services in South Africa.
60
 The researcher aims 
to provide a concise discussion on the improvements introduced by the new Act that were 
deemed necessary as a result of the challenges posed by the ITA. The author will recognise 
that the SSA considerably tightened the regulation of insider trading in South Africa, but may 
in so doing have gone too far in regulating the offence of insider trading.  
 
2.6.1 Introduction of market manipulation as a form of market abuse 
 
The introduction of market manipulation in the SSA certainly had the potential of achieving 
the object of promoting the international competitiveness of securities services in South 
Africa and of enhancing confidence in the South African financial markets.
61
 This offence 
was tightened up in the SSA and the legislation generally in harmonised with other 
comparable cross border regulation, but had the effect of being even more far-reaching than 
foreign legislation.
62
 Section 75(1) of the SSA imposed strict liability for the offence of using 
a prohibited trading practice. Section 76 of the SSA was also wider than the equivalent 
measures in America, the European Union and the United Kingdom in that it not only 
prohibited the making or publishing of false statements in respect of listed securities, but also 
prohibited such statements being made in respect of the past or future performance of a 
                                                          
57
 Cassim R ‗Some Aspects of Insider Trading – Has the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 Gone too far?‘ 
(2007) 19 SAMLJ 44. 
58
 Cassim R ‗Some Aspects of Insider Trading – Has the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 Gone too far?‘ 
(2007) 19 SAMLJ 44. 
59
 In addition to the offence of insider trading, two other offences constitute market abuse, viz, engaging in a 
prohibited trading practice and the making or publishing of false, misleading or deceptive statements, promises 
and forecasts. Also note that it is generally accepted practice that there is no comprehensive or satisfactory 
definition of market abuse that exists to date. See also Chitimira H ‗An analysis of the General Enforcement 
Approaches to combat Market Abuse (Part 1)‘ (2012) 33 Obiter 548-565.  
60
 Preamble of the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004.  
61
 Securities Services Act 36 of 2004. 
62
 Cassim R ‗An Analysis of Market Manipulation under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (Part 2)‘ (2008) 
19 SAMLJ 177-199. 
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public company.
63
 Lastly, the SSA prohibited both the making of false, misleading or 
deceptive statements, promises or forecasts as well as the omission or concealment of a 
material fact that renders a statement, promise or forecast false, misleading or deceptive.
64
 
 
2.6.2 Extension of person to juristic persons 
 
The SSA defined an ‗insider‘ in section 72 as a ‗person who has inside information‘. The 
word ‗Person‘ included a partnership and a trust.   
 
2.6.3 Criminal Liability 
 
In terms of the SSA, a person committed a criminal offence by contravening the provisions of 
section 73 of the Act. Section 115 set out the stiffer penalties which could be imposed upon 
successful prosecution and conviction of an accused. However, the provisions of section 
80(1) required the court to take into account when imposing criminal sanctions any award 
previously made for civil remedies under section 77 arising out of the same cause.  
 
2.6.4 Civil liability 
 
Section 77 granted the FSB more power to institute civil action against an insider who 
contravened the provisions of section 73, if it considered that it was in the public interest to do so.  
 
2.6.5 Enforcement 
 
The SSA established the Directorate of Market Abuse (DMA) to replace the Insider Trading 
Directorate (ITD) of the Insider Trading Act 135 of 1998.65 The functions of the ITD were now 
carried out by the DMA. The scope of the mandate of the DMA was wider than that of the ITD as 
the DMA deals with all forms of market abuse in addition to insider trading cases.66  
 
                                                          
63
 Cassim R ‗An Analysis of Market Manipulation under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (Part 2)‘ (2008) 
19 SAMLJ 177-199. 
64
 Cassim R ‗An Analysis of Market Manipulation under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (Part 2)‘ (2008) 
19 SAMLJ 177-199. 
65
 Section 82 of the SSA. 
66
 Section 82 of the SSA. 
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The SSA certainly tightened-up the regulation of insider trading in South Africa. 
Considerations that should have been made to improve the SSA should have included the 
following. The regulator should rather have made it mandatory for all juristic persons to 
make full and prompt disclosure of all material corporate information. It is further submitted 
that juristic persons ought to be obliged to maintain a restricted list of securities, which would 
assist in reducing instances of insider trading. Moreover, it is suggested that companies which 
engage in share repurchases should be considered insiders of themselves in relation to their 
own shares.  
 
It is submitted that the SSA had gone too far in narrowing down the defences to the insider-
trading offence. For instance, the SSA has repealed certain defences which had existed in the 
ITA, and that may now have the effect of exposing certain innocent groups of persons to 
criminal prosecution under the SSA. The Act seemed to have introduced an anomaly into the 
law in respect of the defence to the disclosure offence, and it has completely eradicated the 
defences to the offence of encouraging or discouraging dealing.  
 
2.7 The Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. 
2.7.1 Introduction 
An evaluation of the regulation of financial markets in South Africa culminated into the 
enactment of a new Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 (FMA),
67
 which replaced the Securities 
Services Act 36 of 2004 (SSA) with effect from 3 June 2013.
68
 The law makers preferred the 
institution of a new Act over complex amendments to the SSA, to enhance legal certainty and 
simplicity.
69
 The three core objectives against which securities regulation can be measured 
are the protection of investors, ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent, and 
the reduction of systemic risk.
70
  
 
2.7.2 Changes introduced by the FMA to the provisions regulating insider trading 
 
                                                          
67
 Financial Markets 19 of 2012. 
68
 Current law regulating market abuse in South Africa. 
69
 Luiz S and Van der Linde K, ‗The Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012: Some comments on the regulation of 
Market Abuse‘ (2013) 25 SAMLJ 458. 
70
 Luiz S and Van der Linde K, ‗The Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012: Some comments on the regulation of 
Market Abuse‘ (2013) 25 SAMLJ 458. 
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The definition of securities in section 1 of the FMA now also includes unlisted securities, 
which were not covered by the SSA.
71
 Critics are however of the view that the market abuse 
provisions do not necessarily always apply to unlisted securities as well
72
 as the insider 
trading offences relate only to securities listed on regulated markets. This is evident from the 
statement of the various offences.
73
 
 
In the light of the requirement of publication - section 74(1)(a) of the SSA stated that 
information was considered to have been made public if it was published in accordance with 
the rules of the relevant regulated market ‗for the purpose of informing clients and their 
professional advisers‘.74 Important information relating to a listed company must now be 
published on the Securities Exchange News Service (SENS).
75
 The new provision is an 
improvement because it excludes any possible debate as to the purpose of a specific 
publication. 
 
2.7.3 Offences and defences under the FMA for insider trading 
 
The insider trading offences are now provided for in section 78 of the FMA.
76
 The offences 
have been expanded, and some of the defences changed. Dealing in one‘s own account was 
formulated in the same way as the provisos under section 73(1)(a) but the defence ordinarily 
available in this section had been formulated rather restrictively, because it seems to imply 
that the instruction to deal must be given directly to the authorised user.
77
 Although ‗dealing‘ 
is defined in section 77 of the FMA as including ‗conveying or giving an instruction to deal‘, 
the word ‗trading‘ is not defined.78 The FMA contains a definition of ‗transaction‘ as 
                                                          
71
 Section 1 of the FMA. 
72
 Luiz S and Van der Linde K, ‗The Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012: Some comments on the regulation of 
Market Abuse‘ (2013) 25 SAMLJ 458. 
73
 See sections 78(1)(a), 78(2)(a), 78(3)(a) and 78(5)(a). Even though s 78(4)(a) does not expressly refer to 
securities listed on a regulated market, the definition of inside information makes it clear in this context. 
74
 Section 74(1)(a) of the SSA. 
75
 See Appendix 1 to Section 11 of the JSE Listings Requirements. SENS ensures the real-time dissemination of 
information ensuring that investors and their professional advisors are fully informed. 
76
 Section 78 of the FMA. 
77
 Luiz S and Van der Linde K, ‗The Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012: Some comments on the regulation of 
Market Abuse‘ (2013) 25 SAMLJ 458 at 464. 
78
 This can viewed as a flaw as the meaning of trading could be argued based on differing views of 
interpretation even though to anyone it would mean the same.  The author is of the view that it could be 
assumed that the Legislature empowered the courts to determine the extent of the meaning of trading and to 
adjudicate it on the basis of the facts of each prosecution. 
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meaning a contract of purchase and sale of securities.
79
 However, as the transaction 
envisaged in this defence is clearly something in pursuit of which trading can occur, it would 
seem that the word is not used in its defined meaning in this instance.
80
 Certain types of 
affected transactions would clearly involve dealing in securities, but the defence is applicable 
in wider circumstances.
81
 The transaction could be any commercial transaction that relies on 
trading for its implementation, provided it was not aimed at exploiting the price movement 
resulting from the inside information.
82
 
 
A commentator opines that in order to raise the transaction defence provided for in section 
78(1)(b)(ii), one has to show that all the parties had the same inside information and that the 
trading was limited to those parties. 
83
 Dealing for someone as covered in the SSA 
substantially remains the same except that dealing for another person through an agent is 
expressly covered.
84
 The FMA requires such an authorised user to show to the contrary that 
she did not know that the client was an insider ‗at the time‘.85 
 
The new Act now introduces a new offence for dealing for an insider. Section 78(3) of the 
FMA provides: 
‗(a) Any person who deals for an insider directly or indirectly or through an agent in 
the securities listed on a regulated market to which the inside information possessed 
by the insider relates or which are likely to be affected by it, who knew that such 
person is an insider, commits an offence. 
(b) A person is, despite paragraph (a), not guilty of any offence contemplated in that 
paragraph if the person on whose behalf the dealing was done had any of the defences 
available to him or her as set out in subsection (2)(b)(ii) and (iii).‘ 
 
                                                          
79
 Luiz S and Van der Linde K, ‗The Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012: Some comments on the regulation of 
Market Abuse‘ (2013) 25 SAMLJ 458 at 463. 
80
 Luiz S and Van der Linde K, ‗The Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012: Some comments on the regulation of 
Market Abuse‘ (2013) 25 SAMLJ 458 at 463. 
81
 Luiz S and Van der Linde K, ‗The Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012: Some comments on the regulation of 
Market Abuse‘ (2013) 25 SAMLJ 458 at 464. 
82
 Section 78(1)(b)(ii)(cc) of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 (FMA). 
83
 Luiz S and Van der Linde K, ‗The Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012: Some comments on the regulation of 
Market Abuse‘ (2013) 25 SAMLJ 458 at 464. 
84
 Section 78(2)(b)(ii) of the FMA. 
85
 Section 78(2)(b)(ii) of the FMA. 
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The new offence differs in important respects from the second offence in section 78(2)(a)
86
 of 
the FMA. First, the perpetrator need not be an insider herself. She merely has to know that 
she is dealing on behalf of an insider.
87
 It is not necessary that the perpetrator knows the 
inside information itself, but she would have to know that the person on whose behalf she 
deals does have inside information, because an insider is defined as someone who has inside 
information.
88
 This is in addition to knowing, for example, that the person is a director or 
employee of the issuer of the securities.
89
 However, a person charged with the new offence in 
section 78(3)(a) of dealing for an insider can assert in defence that the insider on whose 
behalf the dealing was done had any of the defences in section 78(2)(b)(ii) or (iii) available to 
her.
90
  
 
2.7.4 Administrative sanction 
 
Section 82(1) of the FMA provides the details regarding the imposition of an administrative 
sanction.
91
 It states the extent of an administrative sanction that can be imposed for 
contraventions of section 78(1), section 78(2), as well as section 78(3).
92
 The administrative 
sanction imposed by the Enforcement Committee cannot exceed the sum that would be 
reached if one took into account the aggregate of the profit made (or which would have been 
made if the securities had been sold at any stage) or the loss avoided by the insider, person, or 
other person (as the case may be) through the dealing, and an amount of up to R1 million, 
plus three times the amount of the profit made or loss avoided, interest, as well the costs of 
the suit, including investigation costs on a scale decided by the EC.
93
  
 
                                                          
86
 Section 78(2)(a) provides that an insider who knows that he or she has inside information and who deals, 
directly or indirectly or through an agent for any other person in the securities listed on a regulated market to 
which the inside information relates or which are likely to be affected by it, commits an offence. 
87
 Luiz S and Van der Linde K, ‗The Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012: Some comments on the regulation of 
Market Abuse‘ (2013) 25 SAMLJ 458 at 468. 
88
 Luiz S and Van der Linde K, ‗The Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012: Some comments on the regulation of 
Market Abuse‘ (2013) 25 SAMLJ 458 at 468. 
89
 Luiz S and Van der Linde K, ‗The Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012: Some comments on the regulation of 
Market Abuse‘ (2013) 25 SAMLJ 458 at 468. 
90
 Section 78(3) of the FMA. 
91
 Section 82(1) of the FMA. 
92
 Section 82(1) of the FMA. 
93
 Section 82(1)(b) of the FMA. This amount will be adjusted every year by the registrar to reflect the CPI. 
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Section 82(2) regulates the administrative sanction that may be imposed for contraventions of 
section 78(4) and section 78(5).
94
 The offender may be held liable for an administrative 
sanction calculated  in terms of section 82(1), but with reference to the profit made or loss 
avoided by the person to whom the information was disclosed or who was encouraged or 
discouraged.
95
  
 
2.7.5 Regulation of prohibited practices 
Section 80(1)(b) of the FMA has the effect of prohibiting persons who ought reasonably to 
have known that they are participating in a prohibited practice from doing so.
96
 Notably the 
contravention of the prohibition under this section is not crafted to impute criminal liability 
though any contravention of the FMA can still be investigated and may be referred to the EC 
for the imposition of an administrative penalty.
97
 
 
The FMA further expands the range of effects that the practice might include. In addition to 
an artificial price or a false or deceptive appearance of trading activity in connection with the 
security, it might include a false or deceptive appearance of the demand for or supply of a 
security.
98
 This makes sense, because a false appearance of demand or supply could already 
be harmful to the market, even if not acted upon so as to result in actual trades.
99
 Another 
change was that instead of the list of deemed prohibited trading practices in section 75(3) of 
the SSA, the FMA has opted to include in section 80(3) a list of specific contraventions of 
section 80(1), however concerns have been raised in light of this change.
100
 
 
The requirement of knowledge is not mentioned in any of the seven specific 
contraventions.
101
 Instead, two of these offences require an ‗intention‘ to create a false or 
deceptive appearance of trading activity or an artificial market price, three of them focus on 
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the ‗purpose‘ of either creating a false or deceptive appearance of trading activity or an 
artificial market price, while the remaining two make no mention of intention or purpose.
102
 
 
2.7.6 The prohibition on the publishing of false, misleading or deceptive statements; 
promises and forecasts. 
 
This offence has been re-enacted in section 81 of the FMA in substantially the same form as 
in section 76 of the SSA. 
103
 However, while the SSA offence referred to false, misleading or 
deceptive statements, promises and forecasts in respect of the past or future performance of a 
public company, the FMA makes it clear that it must be a company whose securities are 
listed on a regulated market.
104
 A further offence has been created in section 81(2) of the 
FMA.
105
 This is committed where someone has made a false, misleading or deceptive 
statement whilst unaware of the fact that it is false, misleading or deceptive, and subsequently 
becomes aware that it was so but fails to publish without delay a full and frank correction 
with respect to that statement.
106
 For this new offence, there is no possible liability if the 
person was unaware but ought to have become aware of the false, deceptive or misleading 
nature of the statement.
107
  
 
2.7.7 Liability in respect of Prohibited trading practices and the publication of false 
statements or forecasts 
 
Any person who contravenes the prohibited trading practice provision in section 80(1)(a)
108
 
of the FMA and any person who contravenes the false statement prohibition in section 81(1) 
or who fails to publish a correction statement as required by section 81(2)
109
 commits an 
offence and is exposed to the possibility of a fine of up to R50 million and/or 10 years‘ 
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imprisonment.
110
 These sections to do not provide for the imposition of an administrative 
penalty, however such claims could be referred by the DMA to the EC under section 6A(2) of 
the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act (Protection of Funds Act),
111
 or by the 
Registrar of Securities Services in terms of section 99 of the FMA. If the EC determines that 
there has been a contravention of the law, it may impose a penalty payable to the FSB in 
terms of section 6D(2)(a) of the FI (P of F) Act, and could also order the respondent to pay a 
compensatory amount to any person who suffered patrimonial loss as a result of the 
contravention. In such a case, the EC would decide on the compensatory amount, taking into 
account the factors enumerated in section 6D(3) – the amount is not calculated in terms of 
section 82 of the FMA. The penalty is payable to the FSB, and is to be used for consumer 
education or the protection of the public. The compensatory payment is to be made directly to 
the other person or persons who suffered loss because of the contravention. 
 
2.7.8 Concluding remarks on the FMA 
 
The efforts made to protect investors and to ensure that markets are fair, efficient and 
transparent are noticeable through the current framework governing market abuse regulation 
in South Africa. The author agrees with views by critics that the current remedies are still 
very few and/or less dissuasive for the purposes of combating market abuse practices in the 
South African financial markets and comparatively.
112
 Limiting the remedies to those only 
mentioned in the Acts or subordinate legislation does not afford victims of markets a wide 
scope of recourse avenues.
113
 Market abuse remedies such as private rights of action, specific 
civil pecuniary penalties, punitive damages and class actions are not expressly provided for in 
the Financial Markets Act.
114
 Accordingly, it is submitted that the Financial Markets Act 
should be amended to expressly provide for the aforementioned remedies and other coercive 
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market abuse remedies such as injunctions; specific performance orders; cease and desist 
orders; mandatory orders; order for the freezing of assets and name and shaming.
115
  
 
There is thus a need to make available more market abuse remedies and to not only limit it to 
insider trading cases. The following considerations should be effected to improve the 
effectiveness of the FMA.  With the inclusion of the new offence under section 78(3) where a 
person is dealing for an insider may create issues when it concerns as to what the person 
needs to know before they can be considered to have contravened the Act.
116
 Difficulties may 
present themselves where a person on whose behalf the dealing was done was an ‗indirect‘ 
insider: that is, a person whose source of information was, for example, a director and who 
knows this.
117
 In addition, the dealing must be in securities to which the inside information 
relates.
118
 There is lack of consistency in the use of terminology in that the offences in section 
78(1)(a) and section 78(2)(a) of the FMA refer to ‗dealing‘ while the defences in section 
78(1)(b)(ii) and section 78(2)(b)(iii) refer to ‗trading‘ and the distinction between the 
‗transaction‘ and ‗trading‘ in the defence is unfortunate.119  
 
An additional provision is to be made available in the FMA in respect of sanctions for a 
contravention of the prohibited trading practices and false statement prohibitions, although 
the August 2011 Bill included a civil liability provision in this regard.
120
 Though it is clear 
that the provisions of the Protection of Funds Act will be available and the EC can impose an 
administrative sanction for a contravention of these provisions it is better suited to craft this 
in the FMA as primary regulation.
121
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2.8 Conclusion 
 
After having reviewed the degree of legislative developments made on the issue of market 
abuse it is only fair to commend the current framework that South Africa has in place. The 
changes to the market abuse provisions of the FMA do not open up the door for major new 
policy considerations. The original insider trading offence as identified by the Insider Trading 
Act still contains its key elements with a few moderations to reflect international trends and 
best practice. 
 
There is certainly also evidence of a careful reconsideration of the offences and defences 
relating to market abuse – the offence which was originally introduced by the SSA. In 
general, the contraventions have been expanded through the introduction of a new insider 
trading offence of dealing on behalf of an insider and also by extending the prohibition on 
using or participating in a practice that the perpetrator ought to have known was a prohibited 
trading practice. A general tightening of the defences is also apparent. The introduction of 
market manipulation and prohibited trading practices in the SSA assists in achieving the 
object of enhancing confidence in the South African financial markets.
122
  
 
Therefore, the FMA should be welcomed as a piece regulation that will enable South Africa 
to comfortably manage the risks of market abuse for our economy. Chapter 3 introduces us to 
the effectiveness of the market abuse regulatory framework with a specific reference to the 
equities market of the financial market of South Africa. 
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Chapter 3  
AN OVERVIEW OF THE VARIOUS ROLE-PLAYERS IN THE INVESTIGATION, 
DETECTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF MARKET ABUSE REGULATION FOR 
THE EQUITY TRADING MARKET OF SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 Introduction 
Although market abuse regulation in South Africa has developed significantly,
123
 serious 
challenges regarding the enforcement and regulations which address the practice of market 
abuse still remains an area of great concern.
124
 It is therefore necessary to discuss the roles of 
the various role-players in the investigation, detection and enforcement phases of market 
abuse control, because the enforcement of market abuse legislation has been inconsistent and 
problematic. Chapter 2 briefly introduced the various key regulators and regulatory bodies. 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the role the various role-players ought to fulfil in 
regulating the financial markets, but with a specific focus on the securities market – in light 
of an ever growing sophistication around various trading practices that are constantly being 
introduced into this market. Emphasis will be placed on the fact that market participants fail 
to conduct an impact assessment or alignment to regulatory requirements.  
The discussion will commence with an overview of the roles the FSB and the Directorate of 
Market Abuse (DMA) within the FSB have to play in the enforcement of market abuse 
regulation as well as the role of the JSE as a self – regulatory organisation (SRO).125  
Lastly, this chapter will focus on the regulation within the securities market in regard to the 
prevalent market abuse practices in this market. The author will introduce two burning active 
forms of trading that are not adequately regulated in South Africa. This discussion will 
examine the gaps in the current rules governing the Equity market introduced by the JSE, to 
supplement the main legislation in South Africa namely the FMA. The author will summarise 
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the differing views of academics, critics of the profession and conclude with a 
recommendation as to how to manage the current dilemma of high frequency trading. 
3.2 The role of the FSB 
As highlighted before the FSB is an independent board established in terms of the Financial 
Services Board Act.
126
 The FSB has ostensibly wide powers to ensure proper supervision and 
enforcement of the prohibition on insider trading and other market related manipulative 
practices in terms of section 84 of the Financial Markets Act. This section resembles both 
sections 82 and 11 of the Securities Services Act (SSA)
127
 and the Insider Trading Act.
128
 For 
purposes of the discussion under this section the author will highlight specifically the 
provisions that deal with the regulation of market abuse in South Africa. Section 84 provides 
for the powers and duties of the FSB. The FSB is entrusted with a supervisory, full 
prosecutorial and rule making powers as entrenched in section 84 of the FMA.
129
 
Further to this, the FMA also conferred upon it the powers to assist foreign regulators with 
investigations pertaining to any cross-border market abuse cases; publish by notice on its 
official website or by means of other appropriate public media, any outcome, status or details 
of market abuse investigations (public censure) if such publication is in the public interest; 
and to enter  or search any premises in relation to market abuse investigations during the day 
and ensure that such investigations could be assisted by a police officer, in an orderly 
justifiable manner with due regard to the accused person‘s right to dignity, privacy, freedom 
and security.
130
 
 
3.2.1 The current capabilities of the FSB 
The current capabilities of the FSB include staff resources with forensic and prosecutorial 
skills as well as expertise relevant to the financial markets.
131
 Despite being equipped with 
staffing skills including investigative and prosecutorial skills, its lacks the sophistication of 
monitoring and surveillance capabilities matching current trading platforms and systems in 
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order to curb market abuse activities.
132
 Their counterparts in the United States are currently 
using sophisticated market abuse surveillance solutions in order to detect insider dealing and 
market manipulation cases.
133
 Much reliance is still placed on the JSE Surveillance 
department to detect market abuse activities. This is worrying due to the fact that the FSB 
together with the DMA are the entrusted regulators that ought to manage the regulation 
around market abuse in South Africa. Not having surveillance and monitoring capabilities - 
which are currently seen as mechanisms or techniques of enforcement worldwide, creates the 
impression that the regulator is lagging behind the curve and shows no seriousness towards 
the move of capital markets regulation.
134
 The FSB together with the DMA should be 
applauded for the current strength of South African regulation, however regulation is one way 
of curbing the abuse of the markets, strengthening their technological capabilities will assist 
the regulators in curbing the threat of market abuse which threatens investor confidence and 
market transparency in South Africa.
135
 
 
Academic research indicates that the FSB is currently using the following ways of detecting 
and enforcing market abuse regulation.
136
 It is noted that the FSB is currently utilising the 
JSE‘s Surveillance Division to detect suspicious trading volumes and trading patterns.137 It 
further relies on the broker-dealer accounts system to extract relevant information from other 
market participants such as brokers by investigating their trading history for purposes of 
detecting market abuse practices.
138
 The FSB is therefore enabled to check the brokers‘ 
trading history through scrutinizing telephonic conversations, bank records and other relevant 
trading records to detect unusual or abnormal trading patterns which could be a signal of 
market abuse activity.
139
 The FSB uses the auction process system in an attempt to curb 
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market manipulation activities.
140
 It examines trading volumes executed through the JSE 
trading platform at the close of auctions. These trades are kept on record as part of the 
requirements for trading. The trading records of all market participants are also recorded by 
the JSE in order to easily identify and detect unusual trading activities. The JSE has a 
dedicated surveillance capability and staff compliment that conducts daily surveillance on all 
exchange traded activities.
141
 The role of the JSE is discussed in more detail below. One of 
the notable powers granted to the FSB is the role of adjudicator for all cases of possible 
market abuse practices reported to it by various financial institutions and those reported by 
the JSE.
142
 The FSB is therefore authorised to publish or disclose the details of pending 
investigations and provide explicit details of those allegedly identified as market abuse 
offenders on its websites and through communications.
143
 The practice of naming and 
shaming is viewed to be a technique that receives much more recognition as it is a current 
deterrent that prevents persons from engaging in market abuse activities because of the fear 
of losing their jobs and suffering severe reputational risks.
144
 
 
The FSB has also entered into numerous agreements to regulate cross border market abuse 
activities. Authorities namely the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States 
of America and the Financial Services Authority are authorities with whom the FSB has 
fostered such a relationship.
145
 This relationship will be further discussed at a later stage in 
this Chapter. The need for a stronger relationship both nationally and internationally will also 
be discussed in more detail. 
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3.3 The role of the DMA 
 
Section 85 deals with the composition and functions of the directorate of market abuse, a 
creature of statute.
146
 The Directorate was established by section 12 of the Insider Trading 
Act, 1998 (Act 135 of 1998), and continued to exist under the Securities Services Act, 2004 
(Act 36 of 2004), under the name Directorate of Market Abuse, despite those Acts being 
repealed. A reference to the Insider Trading Directorate in any law must, unless clearly 
inappropriate, be construed as a reference to the Directorate of Market Abuse. Subsection (c) 
provides that the directorate exercises the powers of the board— 
(i) to institute any civil proceedings as contemplated in this Chapter; 
(ii) to investigate any matter relating to an offence referred to in section 84(2)(a) and 
(b); and 
(iii) to institute proceedings contemplated in section 84(2)(c) in the name of the board. 
It is stated in section 85(1)(d) that the directorate is not intended to act as an administrative 
body when exercising its powers.
147
 
 
Subsection (2) (a)
148
 provides that the directorate should consist of the chairperson and other 
members and alternate members appointed by the Minister. Subsection (b) states that a 
member and an alternate member hold office for such period, not exceeding three years, as 
the Minister may determine at the time of his or her appointment and is eligible for 
reappointment upon the expiry of his or her term of office: Provided that if on the expiry of 
the term of office of a member reappointment is not made or a new member is not appointed, 
the former member must remain in office for a further period of not more than six months. 
 
Section 85(2)(c) provides that the Minister may remove the chairperson from his or her office 
or terminate the membership of any other member on good cause shown and after having 
given the chairperson or member, as the case may be, sufficient opportunity to show why he 
or she should not be removed or why his or her membership should not be terminated. 
It is stated in section 85(3) that the Minister must appoint the following persons as members 
of the directorate— 
(a) the executive officer of the board or his or her deputy, and may appoint both; 
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(b) one person and an alternate from each of the licensed exchanges in the Republic; 
(c) one commercial lawyer of appropriate experience and an alternate; 
(d) one accountant of appropriate experience and an alternate; 
(e) one person of appropriate experience and an alternate from the insurance industry; 
(f) one person of appropriate experience and an alternate from the banking industry; 
(g) one person of appropriate experience and an alternate from the fund management 
industry; 
(h) one person of appropriate experience and an alternate nominated by any 
organisation that represents shareholders‘ rights or any other similar organisation 
chosen by the Minister; 
(i) one person of appropriate experience and an alternate nominated by the 
South African Reserve Bank; and 
(j) two other persons of appropriate experience and alternates. 
Subsection four provides that the persons referred to in subsection three are nominated by 
reason of their availability and knowledge of financial markets and may not be practising 
authorised users. 
 
Subsection fives states that the directorate must designate from its members a deputy 
chairperson who performs the functions of the chairperson when the office of chairperson is 
vacant or when the chairperson is unable to perform his or her functions. 
It is stated in subsection six that the members of the directorate may co-opt one or more 
persons as additional members of the directorate. 
  
Subsection seven provides that all members of the directorate, other than the additional 
members, have one vote in respect of matters considered by the directorate, but an alternate 
member only has a vote in the absence from a meeting of the member whom the alternate is 
representing. The further subsections of the section provides that - the meetings of the 
directorate are held at such times and places as the chairperson may determine, but four 
members of the directorate may by notice in writing to the chairperson of the directorate 
demand that a meeting of the directorate be held within seven business days of the date of 
such notice. Subsection ten provides that the chairperson must determine the procedure of a 
meeting of the directorate. Furthermore, that the decision of a majority of the members of the 
directorate constitutes the decision of the directorate. It is further provided for in section 85 
that no proceedings of the directorate are invalid by reason only of the fact that a vacancy 
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existed on the directorate or that any member was not present during such proceedings or any 
part thereof. The section concludes by stating that the directorate is, in the performance of its 
functions, assisted by an executive director who is appointed by the board after consultation 
with the directorate and who may attend all meetings of the directorate but may not vote at 
such meetings. 
 
It is clear that the DMA, a committee of the FSB formerly known as the Insider Trading 
Directorate is afforded wide powers and these powers may be delegated or entrusted with the 
FSB. The Directorate of Market Abuse is made up of representatives of the regulated 
markets, the Share Holders‘ Association of South Africa, the fund-management industry, the 
insurance industry, the South African Reserve Bank, the bankers, and the accounting and 
legal professions.
149
 These persons are appointed by the Minister of Finance on the basis of 
their availability, expertise and knowledge of the financial markets.
150
  
 
The Directorate of Market Abuse is empowered to institute any civil proceedings as 
contemplated in the Financial Markets Act and to investigate any matter relating to market 
abuse.
151
 Similar to the FSB if it obtains an appropriate warrant, it has the powers to summon, 
interrogate, and search and seize any documents in possession of suspected persons.
152
  
Moreover, the Directorate of Market Abuse may withdraw, abandon or compromise any civil 
proceedings instituted as contemplated in the regulation on market abuse. Particularly, in 
terms of the FMA, the Directorate of Market Abuse may withdraw, abandon or compromise 
any civil proceedings in respect of both insider trading and market manipulation.
153
 Lastly, 
the Directorate of Market Abuse may, on behalf of the FSB, publish a list of market-abuse 
cases under investigation and proposed action, if any, in the press after every one of its 
meetings.
154
 Thus, the scope of the mandate and functions of the Directorate of Market Abuse 
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is considerably wider because it deals with all the forms of market abuse as provided for in 
the FMA.
155
 
 
Furthermore, the Directorate of Market Abuse may, on behalf of the FSB, decide whether to 
refer a matter to the Enforcement Committee or to institute derivative civil proceedings or to 
refer a matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions.
156
 In addition, the Directorate of Market 
Abuse may only institute civil proceedings in the name of the FSB and may settle any matter 
only after confirmation from the FSB or a competent court.
157
 This may rather indicate that 
the Directorate of Market Abuse exercises only certain specific powers in the name of the 
FSB.
158
 The Directorate of Market Abuse does not operate in isolation. It may further 
investigate any suspected market-abuse cases forwarded to it by the JSE‘s Surveillance 
Division.
159
 To the contrary, the investigation team of the Directorate of Market Abuse 
undertakes full forensic investigations into alerts on the JSE‘s radar screen to detect market-
abuse activities.
160
  
 
Noteworthy to mention in this section is the fact that there is no mention of whether the JSE‘s 
Surveillance Division is statutorily obliged to report incidents of market abuse to the 
Directorate of Market Abuse.
161
 This issue was also never addressed in any of the Acts on 
market abuse regulation; the inference can therefore be drawn to the fact that the surveillance 
capabilities of the FSB are not capable of detecting the practice of market abuse.
162
 It is in the 
interest of proper monitoring and enforcement that it should be inferred that as an SRO and 
assistive regulatory body to the FSB that the JSE should report instances of alleged market 
abuse to the FSB in order to prosecute further.
163
 This will assist in curbing the effects of 
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market abuse in South Africa especially market transparency and investor confidence will 
benefit from this type of initiative.
164
 
 
 
3.4 The role of the Enforcement Committee (EC) 
 
The Enforcement Committee, similar to the DMA is established as another committee of the 
FSB that administers and adjudicates on all the forms of market abuse referred to it by the 
Directorate of Market Abuse or the Registrar of Securities Services.
165
 The FSB extended the 
jurisdiction of the Enforcement Committee to all the industries it regulates under the FMA in 
terms of section 99 of the Financial Markets Act. The Enforcement Committee is made up of 
members who are appointed by the FSB.
166
 The FMA does not provide for any composition 
requirements; however the SSA required that at least two of the members appointed must be 
legally qualified.
167
 It stated further that the Enforcement Committee may further appoint 
additional members with appropriate knowledge and experience.
168
 The functions of the EC 
are not expressly provided for in the FMA, it can be accepted that such powers and functions 
highlighted in terms of the SSA are inherent to this function.
169
 The functions of the 
Enforcement Committee include powers to deal with any matter referred to it in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of the SSA.
170
 The Enforcement Committee is also required to 
submit to the FSB an annual report on the activities of the Enforcement Committee during the 
preceding calendar year within the period and containing the information specified by the 
FSB.
171
 
 
A referral of any matter relating to market abuse may be referred to the EC in terms of the 
Protection of Funds Act and the DMA.
172
 The FMA now also affords the Registrar of 
Securities the power to refer a matter to EC for review.
173
 It is noted that cases where the 
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Registrar of Securities has the power to impose penalties cannot be referred to EC.
174
 A 
referral will be heard by a panel consisting of the chairperson and deputy chairperson of the 
EC together with at least two other members of the committee.
175
 This panel determines its 
own procedure for the performance of its functions and these proceedings are open to the 
public.
176
 The decision of the panel must be given in writing with reasons, and the decision of 
the majority of the members of the panel is regarded as the decision of the EC.
177
  
 
The hearing of any matter by the Enforcement Committee gives all the parties involved an 
opportunity to argue their case.
178
 In other words, the Enforcement Committee may order the 
parties involved or any other person to be examined and cross-examined so as to determine 
whether any market-abuse offence was committed.
179
 The Enforcement Committee may 
therefore impose administrative sanctions such as a penalty for punitive purposes by ordering 
the respondent (offender) to pay a sum of money to the FSB and a compensatory penalty by 
ordering the respondent (offender) to pay any affected person an amount of money 
determined by the Enforcement Committee for the damage or patrimonial loss suffered.
180
 
The Enforcement Committee may further impose a compensatory penalty by ordering the 
respondent who engaged in insider trading practices to pay the FSB an amount of money 
calculated in accordance with relevant provisions of the Securities Services Act.
181
 
 
This compensatory penalty is usually paid by the insider-trading offenders and distributed to 
the affected persons by the FSB. Additionally, the Enforcement Committee may impose 
unlimited administrative penalties on any respondent who admits that he contravened the 
market-abuse provisions or when it determines that he actually contravened such 
provisions.
182
 Furthermore, the Enforcement Committee may impose compensatory orders on 
the market-abuse offenders in cases where there is a link between the unlawful conduct and 
calculable damages suffered by the affected party or the applicant. The Enforcement 
Committee may also impose cost orders on the market-abuse offenders for the investigation 
and preparation costs of the FSB. The Enforcement Committee may yet again order such 
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offenders to pay the remuneration costs of its panel members. Any order made by the 
Enforcement Committee has legal force as if it was made by the High Court and may be 
enforced by the FSB in cases of non-payment by lodging a certified copy of the order with 
the High Court or any competent court.
183
 
 
When determining an appropriate administrative sanction, the Enforcement Committee may 
give regard to other factors such as the nature, duration, seriousness and extent of the 
contravention; any loss or damage suffered; the extent of the profit derived or loss avoided by 
the respondent; the effect of the unlawful conduct on the relevant sector of the financial 
services industry; previous penalties or compensation paid on the same set of facts; the 
degree to which the respondent co-operated with the applicant and the Enforcement 
Committee; any mitigating factors submitted by the respondent that the Enforcement 
Committee considers relevant and the deterrent effect of the administrative sanction.
184
 A 
respondent or any person not happy with the market-abuse sanctions or any order made by 
the Enforcement Committee may appeal to the High Court. In light of this, the appellant does 
not need to apply to the Enforcement Committee for leave to appeal. Moreover, the launching 
of appeal proceedings does not suspend the operation or execution of a decision made by the 
panel of the Enforcement Committee. The appellant may still apply to the chairperson of the 
Enforcement Committee for such suspension.
185
 The Enforcement Committee‘s market-abuse 
proceedings do not affect any person‘s right to seek a legal redress in other appropriate 
forums. It is therefore possible for a respondent to be penalized by the Enforcement 
Committee and also to be sued by the affected person in the civil courts.
186
 
 
It should be noted that administrative sanctions imposed by the Enforcement Committee 
against the market-abuse offenders do not limit the possibility of further criminal prosecution 
or other appropriate disciplinary proceedings to be effected against such offenders.
187
 This 
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does not amount to double jeopardy as the latter court or tribunal is required to take into 
account any previous administrative sanctions imposed by the Enforcement Committee.
188
  
 
The discussion above has only been a description of the referral process that was followed 
when the SSA was operative.
189
 The current FMA does not provide for any process that must 
be followed, it is also silent on the aspects of formation, the referral process and scope of the 
Enforcement Committee.
190
 If the legislature was of the opinion that the initial process as 
highlighted in the SSA should prevail this should have been clearly stated so.
191
 It is rather 
ambiguous not to provide details on the role of the Enforcement Committee in the current 
legislation.
192
 This is clearly a flawed process and ought to be rectified to afford the EC its 
powers. Only being afforded powers of investigation, administration and adjudication that 
stem from a referral process is not an appropriate operating model that the EC is operating 
on.
193
 It should operate similarly to the process followed with the DMA in order to curb 
market abuse practices.
194
  
  
The discussion will now turn to the regulation around the equity market of South Africa by 
starting with a brief introduction into the operations within this market. It will continue to 
highlight the regulations adopted to regulate trading activity on the equity market through the 
JSE. The discussion will then move onto the newly develop trading methods currently 
operative in South Africa, one such method is high frequency trading. The author will then 
revisit the issue of regulation and determine whether the regulatory sphere of South Africa 
adequately regulates high frequency trading.  
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3.5 Equity Market defined 
 
The equity market is the financial market which consists of the mechanisms and conventions 
for the issuing, investing in and trading of shares. The equity market together with the bond 
(and other long-term debt) market comprise the capital market.
195
 Capital markets are 
markets in which institutions, corporations, companies and governments raise long-term 
funds to finance capital investments and expansion projects.
196
 
 
Equity represents ownership in a business or company, thus shareholders or share owners 
own the company through the purchase of shares in the company.
197
 A share is one of a 
number of equal portions of the capital of a company and gives the owner rights in respect of 
the company.
198
 Ownership of a share usually affords a person, typically a shareholder the 
right to a share in the profits of the company; share in the assets of the company if it goes into 
liquidation and the appointment of directors of the company; and voting rights at 
shareholders‘ meetings.199 
Usually the equity market is considered to be synonymous to a stock exchange.
200
 A stock 
exchange is defined as a place – physical or virtual – where buyers and sellers (the users or 
members of the exchange) can meet and trade under rules that are mandated by a regulator 
such as the FSB in South Africa, the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United 
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States and the Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom.
201
 Most industrialised 
nations have at least one major stock exchange, such as the JSE in South Africa.
202
  
 
There are two major sub-divisions of a stock market: the primary market and the secondary 
market. The primary market is where new share issues are sold while secondary markets are 
where previously issued shares are bought and sold.
203
  
 
As mentioned before South Africa has one stock exchange namely the JSE which is an 
exchange licensed in terms of the Securities Services Act.
204
 It regulates the trading, clearing 
and settlement of inter alia equities, warrants and Krugerrand coins.
205
 The JSE is governed 
externally by the FMA, which is administered by the FSB.
206
 The exchange is governed 
internally by its own rules and directives, which must be approved by the FSB.
207
 The 
primary functions of the exchange is to generate risk capital, that is, provide a means for 
companies to issue new shares in order to raise primary capital; and to provide an orderly 
market for trading in shares that have already been issued.
208
 
 
Only qualified shares can be traded on stock exchanges and only by members of the 
exchange.
209
 The JSE operates an order-driven, central order book trading system with 
opening, intra-day and closing auctions.
210
 The JSE operates broker deal accounting system 
(BDA) that its members are obliged to use.
211
 The system facilitates trade confirmation, the 
clearing and settlement of trades between members and their clients, back office accounting, 
drawing up financial statements and compiling client portfolio statements. 
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The equity market is regularly developed and new trading methods are constantly introduced 
in order to make the market more competitive and viable. In any global equities market, the 
hotly debated risks continue to feature high frequency trading, dark executions and crossing 
networks.
212
 The regulators‘ dilemma is to ensure that any newly imposed safeguards and 
controls, such as quote life spans, can mitigate the risks of crashing the market without 
destabilising the current trading ecosystem.
213
 
Market participants can expect that any resulting changes to the market dynamics will almost 
certainly impact where and how market abuse is perpetrated and detected.
214
 For example, if 
a minimum ‗life span‘ is enforced for all market quotes, the market may see a decrease in 
cases of quote stuffing (a form of spoofing) by algorithmic traders.
215
 Of course, there will 
likely be a new to-be-determined variation of abuse that takes its place.
216
 It is now necessary 
to turn to the discussion of high frequency trading. 
3.6 High Frequency Trading 
 
High frequency trading is a manipulative practice that involves persons such as brokers, 
issuers and financial analysts who act in a proprietary capacity to employ sophisticated 
computerised algorithmic decision-making systems in order to obtain advantage from some 
minute discrepancies in the financial markets stock prices and then quickly trade in such 
stocks in large quantities to gain profit.
217
 It is stated that high frequency trading by 
investment banks and hedge funds contributed about 60% to 70% of all stock traded in the 
US‘s financial markets during the global financial crisis and in relation to this, high 
frequency trading profits of between US$8 billion and US$21 billion were recorded in 
2008.
218
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The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the SEC formed a committee which 
recommended the adoption of minimum regulatory requirements such as restrictions on direct 
access and co-location, the imposition of penalties for rapid order cancellation and basic 
quoting requirements for high frequency trading related practices.
219
 However, it is reported 
that the enforcement of high frequency trading regulations remains challenging for many 
regulators because the offenders usually have highly sophisticated and automated algorithmic 
trading mechanisms that are capable of offering high speed stock order responses and to trade 
on such stock price movements after a certain threshold is reached.
220
 It is submitted that lax 
or inconsistent regulation of high frequency trading can unfairly allow large financial 
institutions to engage in market abuse activities and related financial markets systemic risks 
to the detriment of small investors.
221
 The financial markets flash crash of 06 May 2010 is a 
case in point. In response to this flash crash, the SEC proposed rules to combat risks 
associated with high frequency trading related practices like erroneous flash orders and naked 
accesses.
222
 Nonetheless, as is the case in the EU and Australia, the SEC has not yet adopted 
a specific rule to curb high frequency trading related to market abuse activities.
223
 
 
Notwithstanding its fairly wide market abuse prohibition, the Financial Markets Act does not 
specifically discourage high frequency trading, Internet-based market manipulation, program 
trading and other related technologically perpetrated market abuse activities. Likewise, the 
Companies Act 2008 does not specifically discourage high frequency trading and other 
related practices. Although the Financial Markets Act  provide inexhaustible instances where 
some practices may be deemed to be trade-based market manipulation, it is submitted that 
additional provisions should be enacted to expressly prohibit high frequency trading, Internet-
based market manipulation and program trading to enable the FSB to combat technologically 
related market abuse activities in the South African financial markets.  
The JSE has reportedly boosted its information technology department to enhance its 
efficiency especially with regard to its clearing systems, Yield-X interest transactions and 
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Equities derivatives by requiring its members to use the Broker Deal Accounting system to 
enable it to detect market abuse practices involving certain beneficial ownership trades.
224
 
Nonetheless, it is suggested that the JSE and the FSB should consider employing practically 
applicable proposals from other jurisdictions such as the back testing process, real-time risk 
monitoring and market surveillance measures to combat high frequency trading related 
market abuse activities.
225
 It is submitted that the legislature should not just blindly adopt 
regulatory principles from neighbouring jurisdictions without adequate measures in place to 
enforce them. The legislature should therefore place more emphasis on procuring adequate 
technological surveillance machinery, training of competent personnel and educational 
awareness programmes to combat insider trading and not to duplicate the mistakes from other 
jurisdictions regulatory framework. 
 
3.7 The JSE Listing Rules 
 
Listed companies must invest in management and information systems and take a vigorous 
approach to compliance procedures.
226
 Moreover, it is advised that listed companies are 
bound by the provisions of the King Code on Corporate Governance, namely the King III 
Code.
227
 It is stated further that listed companies must ensure that all necessary facilities and 
information is available to holders of its equity securities in order for them to be able to 
exercise their rights.
228
 Significant events affecting the listed company must be announced 
through the Stock Exchange News Service (SENS) and certain announcements must also be 
published in the press.
229
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All listed companies must also comply with the rules regarding disclosure and approval of 
subsequent transactions in accordance with the categories specified in the Equity Listings 
Requirements.
230
 These requirements vary according to the size of the transaction in question, 
from merely making an announcement in respect of the transaction to a requirement to obtain 
shareholder approval in a general meeting.
231
 As regards general disclosure obligations, in 
general, with the exception of trading statements and unless the information is subject to a 
confidentiality obligation, the listed company must release an announcement providing 
details of "any development(s) in the listed company's sphere of activity that is/are not public 
knowledge and which may, by virtue of its/their effect(s), lead to material movement of the 
reference price, in the listed company's listed securities".
232
 
A listed company is also obliged to issue cautionary announcements once it has acquired 
knowledge of any material price sensitive information and the degree of confidentiality 
required either cannot be maintained or the listed company suspects that confidentiality may 
or has been breached.
233
 
 
The above mentioned guidelines provided for in the listings rules are interpreted as 
mechanisms or guidelines for brokerages, financial institutions with dealing facilities and 
asset management firms to align their practices to be market abuse compliant as introduced 
by the Financial Market Act 19 of 2012. It is important to note that the JSE Listing rules are 
silent on the salient principles of market abuse.
234
 The topics are discussed in more detail in 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Equity rules
235
, Interest Rate and Currency rules
236
 
and the Derivatives rules. 
237
 For purposes of this dissertation, the author will focus on the 
regulation provided for in the equity rules.
238
 Section 7 deals with the prevention and 
detection of market abuse and places a duty of market participants to ensure that market 
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conduct mechanisms are adopted by these participants.
239
  The rules provides that each 
member must give consideration to the circumstances of orders placed by clients before 
entering such orders in the JSE equities trading system and must take reasonable steps to 
satisfy itself that such orders and any resultant trades will not result in a breach of the 
provisions of section 80 of the Act (Prohibited trading practices).
240
 In this regard it is 
recommended that firms must invest in adopting internal policies and procedures that caters 
for these nuances.
241
 Investing more in the development of pre and post trade surveillance 
techniques are the key controls big financial institutions are implementing and embedding at 
this stage.
242
 
 
It is further submitted that members must ensure that all of its employees who are involved in 
the receipt of orders from clients and the execution of transactions in equity securities on the 
JSE equities trading system are familiar with the market abuse provisions in sections 77 to 80 
of the Act.
243
 To also ensure that those employees receive adequate training and guidance to 
enable them to recognise and avoid entering into any transaction on behalf of the member or 
its clients which will result in, or is likely to result in, a breach of those provisions.
244
 In this 
regard brokerages and financial institutions are required to develop internal training material 
and to conduct regulation interactive sessions with dealing and trading staff on the principles 
of market abuse.
245
 Brokerage firms are required to foster awareness around market, one such 
example is ensuring that annual compliance training on market abuse principles are 
conducted by each staff member of the firm or bank.
246
 A dedicated compliance function or 
officer needs to be appointed to focus on market abuse.
247
 Their day to day duties would 
include embedding a compliance culture where market conduct principles are developed and 
embedded.
248
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As alluded to by the author in a preceding paragraph, a higher reliance is placed on the 
internal compliance function of all market participants.
249
 The rules provides that a member‘s 
compliance monitoring procedures must specifically include procedures to monitor orders 
entered into, and transactions executed on, the JSE equities trading system by the member 
and its employees, with the objective of identifying and taking appropriate action in relation 
to orders or trades that, in the reasonable opinion of the member, may constitute a breach of 
the provisions of sections 78 and 80 of the Act.
250
  
 
In formulating and implementing the compliance monitoring procedures referred to above, a 
member is not expected to monitor every order entered into, and every trade executed on, the 
JSE equities trading system by the member, for the purpose of identifying potential market 
abuse.
251
 Nevertheless, whilst members are encouraged to implement monitoring procedures 
to detect any activity undertaken by the member‘s employees or its clients which may 
constitute a breach of the provisions of sections 78 and 80 of the Act, the procedures should, 
as a minimum, aim to detect activity which, to a reasonable person observing or reviewing 
such activity, would constitute a blatant breach of the provisions of sections 78 and 80 of the 
Act taking into account all relevant factors such as:  
 the identity of the parties to the transaction;  
 the perceived intention of the parties to the transaction;  
 the frequency and pattern of transactions over a period of time;  
 the effect of the transaction on market prices or volumes;  
 the size and timing of the transaction; or  
 a combination of two or more of these factors.252 
 
Market participants are regularly engaging surveillance vendors in order to obtain the most 
appropriate infrastructure to implement an internationally recognised surveillance 
capability.
253
 One such surveillance tool is SMARTS Broker NASDAQ OMX, this is a post 
trade surveillance tool deployed by the JSE and certain banks in South Africa to do market 
abuse surveillance.
254
 The surveillance capability provides post trade reports or alerts on a 
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trading day plus one (T plus 1) basis.
255
 The alerts are developed and customised by 
compliance and business analysts who are subject matter experts on market abuse 
monitoring.
256
 The  framework consists of a surveillance, investigation, escalations, and 
reporting on potential market abuse contraventions in relation to client, employee and bank 
trading activity across a range of products and jurisdictions and is based on a risk based 
approach as well as improving the general control framework in relation to market abuse.
257
 
 
 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
Regulatory enforcement is crucial to determine and test whether any new piece of legislation 
has been successfully implemented. In order to investigate whether the FMA had  been 
successfully implemented to curb market-abuse practices in South Africa, it was necessary to 
review the role-players involved in the investigation and prevention of market-abuse activity 
in South Africa, namely, the FSB, the Directorate of Market Abuse and the Enforcement 
Committee.  
 
In this regard it was noted that significant progress has been made in the enforcement of the 
market-abuse prohibition in South Africa. The Directorate of Market Abuse was established 
as an investigatory arm of the Financial Services Board, while the Enforcement Committee 
was empowered to hear cases of market abuse and to impose unlimited administrative 
sanctions against anyone who violates the market-abuse provisions in South Africa.  With 
regard to the detection of market-abuse activities, the FSB depends mainly on the JSE‘s 
Surveillance Division.
258
 
 
There were however, various shortcomings noted in the enforcement of the market-abuse 
provisions in South Africa. Notably, the criminal penalties imposed against market-abuse 
offenders are still very little for deterrence purposes.
259
 Furthermore, the establishment of 
additional structures such as the Enforcement Committee to hear market-abuse cases on a 
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referral basis, and the introduction of administrative sanctions has not been able to encourage 
all persons to comply with the market-abuse prohibition in South Africa.
260
 
 
It was also indicated that the Directorate of Market Abuse does not have the power of its own 
to make market-abuse rules and this could be affecting the execution of its duties negatively. 
In relation to this, it was suggested that the Directorate of Market Abuse (which is a 
committee of the FSB) should be allowed to execute its duties without prior confirmation 
from the FSB in order to curb potential bureaucracy. 
 
It was also suggested that the Directorate of Market Abuse should have its own surveillance 
systems in place to detect, investigate and prevent the occurrence of market-abuse practices 
in the South African financial markets.
261
 
 
A noteworthy enforcer has been the JSE, as a self-regulatory organisation, it has well 
embedded the FMA framework into its operations.
262
 It has also been a leading trend setter in 
that it has made sure that all market participants making use of its platforms and operations 
are well aligned to the purport and objects of the FMA.
263
 It has developed world class 
surveillance capabilities and market leaders such as Standard Bank of South Africa offering 
brokerage services to clients has also well embedded a culture of compliance and adherence 
to the market abuse principles as stipulated in the Insider Trading Booklet prepared and 
managed by the JSE.
264
 
 
Having noted this, it is clear that the enforcement role-players have interrelated roles to play 
in combatting market abuse and that it is a cooperative venture in which each stakeholder is 
to give their full support and guidance. The enforcement framework is clear as to what it 
prescribes and the guidance set out therein. It is the prerogative of each enforcer to ensure 
that they improve their internal processes and to align their framework.  
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The objective of each enforcer should be to manage the effects of insider trading and market 
manipulation on the economy and dealings with international counterparts. This can only be 
done through proactive investigation and constantly working at conformance and align its 
operations to mirror the statutory obligations as set out in the FMA. All affected should work 
closely together to combat market abuse that is from the small investment firm to the 
regulator as each stakeholder can learn and leverage off their experiences and exposure with 
the law governing the financial markets and that speaks to market abuse control. A 
comparative review between South Africa and the United Kingdom will follow in Chapter 
Four. 
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Chapter 4  
THE REGULATION OF MARKET ABUSE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE. 
4.1 Introduction  
The integrity of the market is essential for confidence, and consequently the proper operation 
of the markets for financial instruments and for the protection of investors.
265
 If confidence is 
lacking, this undeniably means that investors and those seeking to raise capital will no longer 
be prepared to actively trade in these markets. Therefore a robust and relatively effective 
market abuse control regime had to be fostered in the United Kingdom, a well-developed 
large economy and trading hub.
266
  
Regulation on the area of market abuse in the United Kingdom (UK) came with the advent of 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which was designed to preserve the criminal 
and regulatory aspects of its previous market misconduct regime.
267
 The redress sought 
through the enactment of the FSMA was further aimed at addressing the weaknesses in the 
enforcement of its civil regulatory framework and criminal law by creating a civil offence of 
market abuse.
268 The market abuse regulatory framework of the United Kingdom is perhaps 
one that most accurately mirrors the framework adopted by South Africa.  
Therefore in this Chapter, a brief comparative analysis of the regulatory frameworks in these 
two countries will be carried out. The chapter will focus more broadly on a comparative 
overview of the role-players in the detection, investigation and enforcement of the market 
                                                          
265
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abuse prohibition in the UK. The researcher will focus on the broader aspects of market abuse 
for the purpose of this mini-dissertation.   
Furthermore, this Chapter will examine whether integration of the UK market abuse 
principles into the South African regulatory framework has worsened or improved the 
regulation of insider trading in South Africa. Therefore relevant UK legislative developments 
will be reviewed in light of many cases which have been pursued under this regulatory 
scheme and where necessary contrasted with similar cases and provisions in South Africa.
   
4.2 The Market Abuse Regime of the United Kingdom 
4.2.1 The legislative framework and case law of the UK 
The UK‘s insider trading regime commenced in 1980.269 Prior to this, two legislative 
attempts to outlaw insider trading in the early 1970s were unsuccessful.
270
 The legislature 
enacted the Companies Act 1980, however, this Act made insider trading a criminal offence 
only in certain specified circumstances.
271
 The Act also provided some requirements for 
directors, members of their families and substantial shareholders to report any dealings in 
shares of their companies to discourage the misuse of non-public inside information.
272
 The 
Act was later revised and consolidated into the Companies Act 1985, which was later revised 
into the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985.
273
 This Act prohibited individuals 
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(insiders) who had access to material non-public inside information by virtue of their position 
within a company from dealing in the securities of the company while having such 
information.
274
 The Insider Dealing Act however, only provided criminal sanctions for 
insider trading violations, making its application somewhat restricted and narrow.
275
 In 1986 
the legislature introduced the Financial Services Act; the provisions of this Act were still 
applicable only to individuals and offered no civil remedy for such individuals who were 
prejudiced by insider trading.
276 The Criminal Justice Act was introduced in 1993 and 
prohibited individuals from engaging in approximately three forms of conduct that would 
amount to insider trading.
277
 Individuals were prohibited from dealing in price-affected 
securities on the basis of non-public material inside information.
278
 Secondly, individuals 
were prohibited from encouraging (tipping) other persons to deal in price-affected securities 
on the basis of non-public material inside information.
279
 Lastly, the Criminal Justice Act 
prohibits individuals from knowingly and improperly disclosing non-public material inside 
information to other persons.
280
 
 
The prohibition on market manipulation in the UK was made by the Larceny Act 1861.
281
 
This Act criminalised fraudulent misrepresentations intended to create a false market.
282
 The 
second attempt to regulate market manipulation in the UK was possibly introduced under the 
Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939.
283
 However, this Act was repealed by the 
Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958.
284
 The Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 
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1958 prohibited dishonest concealment of material non-public inside information relating to 
any securities for personal gain or the benefit of others.
285
 However, its purported market 
abuse ban was extremely difficult to enforce, especially where the wrongful conduct was 
committed outside the UK.
286
 As a result the legislature enacted a new market manipulation 
prohibition under the Financial Services Act.
287
 In order to align the market abuse legislative 
framework with best practice, the Financial Services and Markets Act came into effect on 
1 December 2001.
288
 The provisions were extensively revised on 1 July 2005 after the 
adoption of the Treasury‘s Market Abuse and Investment Recommendation (Media) 
Regulations to implement the EU Market Abuse Directive and its so-called Level 2 
Implementing Measures. Market manipulation was further indirectly made a criminal offence 
under the Fraud Act.
289
  
 
The author will provide a general overview of the development of market abuse legislation in 
the UK followed by a comparison with developments in South Africa. The market abuse 
regime of the UK applies to all persons, whether or not authorised or approved under the 
FSMA of 2000.
290
 Hence, all major UK markets have been subject to the provisions of the 
FSMA which prohibits market abuse, a practice  which may be penalised with unlimited fines 
imposed the Financial Services Authority (FSA) or a court order for restitution to compensate 
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investors who have suffered losses as a result of market abuse.
291
  Any such orders are 
however subject to a right of appeal to the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal.
292
   
The Act as originally enacted under Part VIII, section 118 made provision for three types of 
market abuse practices namely – the misuse of non-public information; the creation of false 
or misleading market impressions and market distortion.
293
 It also provided that no behaviour 
of these abovementioned descriptions would amount to market abuse unless contrary to the 
standards of a hypothetical ‗regular user‘ of the market are proven.294 Having been 
comprehensively amended by the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR), the Act also provide for 
the adoption of the Code and the procedure for imposing fines.
295
 The definition of market 
abuse was therefore further developed, reflecting a policy decision to comply with the 
requirements of the European Unions‘ Market Abuse Directive (MAD).296 The changes 
brought about in a response to this directive provisioned for seven types of behaviour which 
would amount to market abuse for the purposes of FSMA.
297
 The practices of (i) insider 
dealing; (ii) improper disclosure of inside information; (iii) the misuse of relevant 
information not generally available, not provided for under (i) or (ii) and contrary to the 
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standards of the regular user; (iv) transactions or orders to trade which create false market 
impressions or artificially support prices; (v) transactions or orders to trade which employ 
fictitious devices or any other form of deception or contrivance; (vi) disseminating false or 
misleading information; and (vii) behaviour creating false or misleading impressions or 
market distortions not caught under (iv) or (v) above and contrary to the standards of a 
regular user. This practice would be relevant to behaviour which does not amount to a 
transaction under (iv) in an investment.
298
 
As mentioned before, the FSA was obligated to issue a Code that provides guidance to those 
determining whether or not behaviour amounts to market abuse.
299
 It empowered the 
Regulator to punish both regulated and unregulated market participants whose market 
conduct falls below the acceptable standards of market conduct as defined by a reasonable 
user of the market.
300
 The MAD introduced a common EU approach for preventing and 
detecting market abuse and ensuring that the flow on information to the market is equally 
accessible to all participants.
301
 
 
The market abuse offence is triggered when behaviour occurs in relation to qualifying 
investments or related investments that are traded on a prescribed market.
302
 This essentially 
captures four elements in the determination of the offence. In determining the prescribed 
market it is emphasised that the UK Treasury authorises these prescribed markets to which 
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this market abuse regime applied to.
303
 The prescribed markets include the London Stock 
Exchange; the International Petroleum Exchange, the London Metal Exchange, the Euronext-
LIFFE, Virt-x and the EDX London. This list may however be amended by the HM Treasury 
as it has the authority to prescribe markets which are located in other jurisdictions.
304
 Hence, 
the test for a prescribed market is that it may either be located within the UK or be accessible 
electronically from within the UK.
305
  
 
The HM Treasury authorised by the FSMA, qualified investments. The Treasury references 
investment instruments that are listed in article 1(3) of the MAD, which covers a broad 
number of financial instruments.
306
 Also included are any other investments admitted to 
trading on a regulated market in an EEA state or for which a request for admission to trading 
has been made for such market.
307
 It further covers offences for which the UK recognised 
investments exchanges (RIEs) are the primary traded markets. The practice of insider dealing 
and the improper disclosure of inside information apply to related investments of qualifying 
investments that are traded on prescribed markets. Related investments refer to any financial 
instrument admitted to trading (or where such request for admission has been made) on a 
regulated market situated or operated in the UK or EEA state. It is crucial to highlight that 
under the FSMA, no penalty will be applied for market abuse if a person can be said to have 
taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing, and 
reasonably believed that he had not committed, market abuse.
308
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A case that clearly highlights a situation in which these four elements were relied upon is the 
Jabre case.
309
 Mr. Phillipe Jabre entered into agreements to short sell the stock of the 
Japanese bank Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group a few days after receiving price-sensitive 
information about the bank from a Goldman Sachs salesman.
310
 Jabre argued that as a matter 
of law that his conduct was contrary to the purports of section 118 because his trades in the 
SMFG shares occurred on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and could not be recognised as 
qualifying investments on a prescribed market.
311
 The FSA however found that Jabres‘ 
behaviour did occur in relation to qualifying investments of a corporate body that were traded 
on a prescribed market.
312
 The matter also highlighted a duty that market participants have to 
the market and that is to maintain transparency and the overall market confidence.
313
  
 
The EU Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation Directive defines insider dealing as a form 
of market abuse which can constitute both a civil and criminal offence.
314
 The Directive 
recognises both primary and secondary insiders. Under primary insiders, the scope of 
personal liability for primary insiders has been expanded by excluding any requirement that 
they have full knowledge of the facts in order for criminal or civil liability to be imposed.
315
 
By repealing this notion, it is now recognised that primary insiders may have access to insider 
information on a daily basis and are aware of the confidential nature of the information they 
receive.
316
 Secondary insiders are recognised as any person who with full knowledge of the 
facts possess inside information.
317
 
                                                          
309
 Phillip Jabre and the Financial Services Authority (Decision on Market Abuse), the Financial Services and 
Markets Tribunal (10 July 2006). See also Rider, Alexander, Linklater et al Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 
2ed (2009). 
310
 Rider, Alexander, Linklater et al Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 2ed (2009). 
311
 Swan, Virgo Market Abuse Regulation 2ed (2010). 
312
 Rider, Alexander, Linklater et al Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 2ed (2009). 
313
 Rider, Alexander, Linklater et al Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 2ed (2009). 
314
 Rider, Alexander, Linklater et al Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 2ed (2009). 
315
 Rider, Alexander, Linklater et al Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 2ed (2009). 
316
 Swan, Virgo Market Abuse Regulation 2ed (2010). 
317
 Swan, Virgo Market Abuse Regulation 2ed (2010). 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
 
In comparison to the UK, the legislative regime followed by South Africa is much in 
congruence with that of the UK.
318
 The South African prohibition on insider trading ban has 
an extra-territorial application in contrast to the UK‘s insider trading regime which only 
applies to any dealing that takes place on a regulated market which operates in the UK. 
Furthermore, although the words ―through an agent‖ are used in some provisions that 
discourage insider trading under the Financial Markets Act, this Act does not expressly 
provide a statutory definition for the term ―agent‖. Lastly, unlike the UK, South Africa 
recognises insider trading as both a civil and criminal offence. 
 
A test that could possibly be applied in South Africa is the regular user test – which is 
effectively a reasonable persons test. This will assist the FSB in assessing in behaviour and 
action which is below this standard of any person who ordinarily deals and understands 
trading in the financial markets. 
 
South Africa broadly characterises the offences of market abuse as insider trading, market 
manipulation and the direct or indirect publishing of false and deceptive statements.
319
 Under 
the commission of insider dealing in the UK and which is referred to as insider trading in 
South Africa it is interesting to note that the legislature has failed to define what is meant by 
the commission of insider trading, this term is borrowed from the US which also refers to the 
commission of insider dealing.
320
 Another development that is noted in the UK is that the 
FSMA placed an obligation on the FSA to produce a code containing guidance on whether 
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behaviour amounts to market abuse.
321
 The FMA of South Africa in terms of section 85(2) 
provides that the FSB may make market abuse rules after consultation with the directorate - 
(i) concerning the administration of the Chapter XI (deals with the offence of market abuse) 
by the board and the directorate; (ii) concerning the manner in which investigations in terms 
of this Chapter XI are to be conducted.
322
 This places a discretionary instead of a mandatory 
obligation on the FSB to manage and enforce the anti-market abuse regime.
323
  
 
The UK recognises about seven types of market abuse which are statutorily prohibited, only 
three forms of market abuse practices, namely insider trading, prohibited trading practices 
(trade-based market manipulation) and the making or publication of false, misleading or 
deceptive promises, statements or forecasts (disclosure-based market manipulation) are 
statutorily discouraged in South Africa.
324
 A practice would be deemed market manipulation 
and/or other market abuse offences in terms of the Financial Services and Markets Act if it 
occurs in the UK or in relation to any qualifying investments which are mainly traded on a 
prescribed market in the UK or the relevant EU member states.
325
 In essence market 
manipulation and other market abuse practices have a restricted extra-territorial application. 
In South Africa, conduct may amount to market manipulation or insider trading if it was 
made in relation to securities listed on a regulated market (whether domestic or foreign) 
which is run in terms of the laws of the country in which the market conducts business as a 
market for dealing in securities listed on that market.
326
 This implies, in contrast to the 
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322
 Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990. 
323
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position in the UK, that the South African market abuse prohibition is unlimitedly applicable 
to securities listed on any regulated foreign market and to both natural and juristic persons.
327
 
 
The FSA was conferred more powers as a single administrative regulator to ensure that the 
prohibition on market manipulation and related practices is consistently complied with; it 
issued a Code of Market Conduct.
328
 The FSA has, for instance, issued the Code of Market 
Conduct to guide all the relevant persons on conduct that amounts to market manipulation 
and related practices (including factors to be considered when determining whether such 
conduct amounts to market abuse) in the UK.
329
 This Code of Market Conduct has, for 
instance, stipulated some factors to be considered when determining whether a person dealing 
in any qualifying investment has created a false or deceptive appearance of a trading activity 
in relation to a certain security or an artificial price or value of the qualifying investment and 
the extent to which the price, rate or option volatility movements for the affected investment 
are outside their normal daily, weekly or monthly range.
330
 Although such market conduct is 
also prohibited by the Financial Markets Act, it is not quite clear whether the FSB has a 
similar Code or booklet containing the guidelines regarding the behaviour that amounts to 
market manipulation or related practices in South Africa.
331
 
 
A new regulation namely, the Market abuse regulation (MAR), which will apply from 3 July 
2016 will strengthen the existing UK market abuse framework by extending its scope to new 
                                                          
327
 Sections 77; 78; 80; 81& 82 of the Financial Markets Act. Also see generally Jooste 2006 SALJ 453; Cassim 
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LJ 44 66-67. 
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 Article 11 of the EU Market Abuse Directive. See further Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 38; paragraph 3 above. 
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markets, new platforms and new behaviour.
332
 It contains prohibitions for insider dealing and 
market manipulation, and provisions to prevent and detect these.
333
  
 
4.3 Enforcement of market abuse prohibitions in the UK and South Africa 
The discussion that will follow will be a review of the enforcement capability of South Africa 
in contrast to that of the UK. Similar to the UK where the FSA is the main single body which 
administers and has the mandate to enforce the market abuse prohibition, SA too entrusts 
such a responsibility to the FSB.
334
 The powers of the FSA amongst others include the power 
to investigate or refer a matter to its Regulatory Decisions Committee (the RDC); impose 
unlimited monetary penalties; make a public statement that a person has engaged in market 
abuse, and to apply to the courts for an injunction to claim restitution or restrain continued 
market abuse.
335
 The FSA may further make market abuse rules and determine the general 
policy and principles to govern the performance of particular functions in the relevant 
financial markets.
336
 In order to enhance its enforcement, the FSA is divided into several 
divisions such as the Supervision, Markets and Enforcement Divisions.
337
 The FSA may 
furthermore, appoint additional persons as investigators of certain market abuse cases and can 
also act as a quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative regulatory body.
338
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333
 Market Abuse Regulation available at https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/markets/market-abuse/mar (accessed on 
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The FSB bears the sole responsibility and function to oversee the enforcement of the 
securities and market abuse provisions in South Africa.
339
 Nonetheless, unlike the position in 
the UK, where the Bank of England‘s regulatory mandate does not include banks because 
they are regulated by the FSA, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and not the FSB 
oversees the regulation of banks in South Africa.
340
 In this regard, the FSA‘s regulatory 
powers are broader than those of the FSB. However with the development of the twin peaks 
model of regulation, a new regulator namely a market conduct regulator will be introduced 
and will in all likelihood be entrusted with the mandate to cover conduct.
341
 Prudential 
regulation will still be with the SARB, but only to manage prudential related issues.
342
  
 
Nevertheless, like the FSA, the FSB administers and enforces the civil market abuse 
provisions in South Africa.
343
 It can be said that the FSB is also not as fortunate as the FSA to 
be staffed and adjudicated by sufficient and competent persons to enhance its cross-border 
market abuse enforcement efforts in South Africa considering the low prosecution rate insider 
trading and market manipulation cases reported in South Africa.
344
 The FSA and the FSB 
both have quasi-legislative (rule-making) powers.
345
 Although this is a commendable 
achievement and welcomed, the regulatory interaction and engagement by the FSB has to 
date not been so visible.
346
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Unlike the FSA‘s Code of Market Conduct which supplemented and defined market abuse 
conduct in the UK, such conduct is merely outlined, mainly in Chapter X of the Financial 
Markets Act, an area where much development is still required from a South African 
perspective.
347
 All investigations instituted by the FSB are escalated to it by the JSE as well 
as on a rare basis through tip- offs.
348
 This is however not the position in the UK as the FSA 
is authorised to appoint additional skilled persons to provide it with reports or relevant 
information relating to any suspected market abuse violations.
349
  
 
Notably, in order to enhance compliance and the general enforcement of the market abuse 
prohibition in South Africa, the FSB has also purportedly entered into co-operation 
agreements with other international regulatory bodies such as the FSA, the SEC and the 
IOSCO.
350
 However, it remains to be seen whether these co-operation agreements will be 
fully exploited by the FSB to combat cross-border market abuse activities in South Africa.
351
 
 
In the detection phase of market abuse, the FSA in conjunction with the London Stock 
Exchange (the LSE) relies on the Stock Exchange Automated Quotation market marking 
system to detect all possible market abuse activities in the relevant financial markets.
352
 
Moreover, all listed UK equities and other investments listed on a subsidiary market known 
as the Alternative Investment Market could further rely on the Stock Exchange Alternative 
Trading System or Stock Exchange Automated Quotation or another trading system known as 
                                                          
347
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the Stock Exchange Alternative Trading System Plus to detect and curb market abuse 
practices.
353
 The collaboration in South Africa is not as strong as in the UK as currently there 
is only a cooperation with the JSE and BESA to ensure that the capability to combat market 
abuse is strengthened, it would be advisable that the FSB, JSE, BESA and market participants 
all collaborate in the fight to combat market abuse.
354
 
 
In the UK, several self-regulatory organisations (the SROs) have made a significant 
contribution to the supervision and regulation of the securities and financial services industry 
to date.
355
 During the 1970s and the early 1980s, the SROs such as the Bank of England, the 
Personal Investment Authority, the Investment Management Regulatory Organisation, the 
Securities and Investments Board (the SIB) and the Securities and Futures Authority (the 
SFA) played a leading role in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of securities and 
market abuse cases in the UK.
356
  
 
It appears as if the importance of the role of such organisations has to some extent been 
overlooked in South Africa.
357
 This may be reflected, in part, by the fact that only a few 
SROs, namely the JSE, the EC, the Directorate of Market Abuse (the DMA) and the 
Takeover Regulation Panel (the TRP), are either directly or indirectly involved in the 
enforcement of the securities and market abuse laws in South Africa.
358
 Nevertheless, apart 
from the JSE, there are no other SROs that are statutorily, specifically and mainly responsible 
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for enforcing market abuse laws in South Africa.
359
 As a result, not many SROs have been 
actively involved in the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition to supplement the 
efforts of the FSB in South Africa to date.
360
 South Africa seems to have blindly adopted 
some of the enforcement methods that are employed in the UK by empowering the FSB as 
the only main regulatory board that oversees the enforcement of its market abuse ban.
361
 In 
relation to this, it is suggested that South Africa should consider practically implementing 
only the relevant principles of the UK‘s single regulator model because it is economical and 
less complex.
362
 This could increase the number of settlements and convictions in market 
abuse cases in South Africa.
363
 Additionally, it is not certain whether other SROs in South 
Africa have the same or similar statutory leverage available to the FSB to make their own 
decisions, rules and appropriate regulations in relation to market abuse offences.
364
 However, 
it is important to note that the DMA and the EC have functions almost similar to those of 
their UK counterparts, the RDC and the FSMT respectively.
365
 
 
The relevant courts and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) have played an 
important role in the enforcement of securities and market abuse laws in the UK as its main 
prerogative was to prosecute all criminal cases involving market abuse.
366
 Being afforded the 
power to prosecute market abuse cases of its own volition, the FSA still relies on the courts 
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for further investigations and prosecution.
367
 Despite the fact that some weaknesses and 
irregularities still exist in the criminal enforcement of the market abuse prohibition, the courts 
have to date successfully prosecuted a considerable number of cases involving market abuse 
in the UK.
368
 For instance, cases like the Chase Manhattan Equities v Goodman
369
 have been 
adequately prosecuted. In this case Knox J held that any transaction or dealing based on the 
misuse of inside information was against public policy, unenforceable and consequently 
resulted in criminal liability on the part of the offenders.
370
 Moreover, in the Scott v Brown
371
 
case, the Court of Appeal held that an agreement to stabilise the price of shares while a 
number of certain shares were brought into the financial market was illegal and 
unenforceable.
372
  
 
When one considers the position in the UK, it appears that apart from the FSB and the 
Enforcement Committee (the EC), only the High Courts or Regional Courts have the 
jurisdiction to hear market abuse cases under the Financial Markets Act.
373
 Nonetheless, the 
high evidentiary burden employed in criminal cases of market abuse remains probably the 
main contributory factor of the paucity of convictions obtained in such cases in both the UK 
and South Africa.
374
 Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the Financial Markets Act‘s 
market abuse provisions will enhance the combating and prosecution of market abuse cases 
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in South Africa.
375
 Additionally, unlike the position in the UK, it is not quite certain whether 
the relevant courts in South Africa may also rely on any skilled persons from the FSB itself 
or on persons who are assigned to them by the FSB to adjudicate in market abuse cases.
376
 A 
great deficiency that South Africa is burdened with is the absence of sufficient persons with 
the relevant expertise to adjudicate in matters involving market abuse remains a significant 
challenge for the competent courts in South Africa.
377
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
The UK employs a rigorous enforcement and prosecution framework from which South 
Africa could learn many lessons.
378
 The adoption of some principles from the UK regulatory 
framework shows a significant effort by our legislature to broaden and develop an adequate 
market abuse banning in South Africa.
379
 It should be noted that while this should be 
commendable many deficiencies such as inconsistent enforcement of these provisions and 
related enforcement mechanisms directly impedes the efforts by our regulator, the courts and 
those fighting the ban of market abuse.
380
 
 
The author therefore submits that the legislature should not just blindly borrow and adopt 
principles and lessons learnt from the UK regulatory framework without adequately 
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evaluating the applicability of these principles to the South African market infrastructure, 
South Africa‘s current capability to enforce such principles and what the effect of such 
measures would be on market participants and dealing members.
381
 It is noteworthy to 
mention that it is evident that South Africa has placed more attention and efforts on procuring 
adequate technological surveillance machinery.
382
 However it should align its efforts to 
upskill South Africa‘s current regulatory competency, developing a code of conduct for 
market participants and further educational awareness programmes to combat market 
abuse.
383
  
In the next Chapter the researcher will review the current regulatory landscape of Nigeria 
against South Africa‘s, in order to gain more insight into market abuse regulation and 
enforcement in Nigeria. 
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Chapter 5  
MARKET ABUSE REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT IN NIGERIA: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE. 
5.1 Introduction 
Nigeria boasts with a well-developed market abuse regulatory framework with a focus on 
securities regulation second to South Africa on the African continent. The enforcement of the 
regulation on market abuse in Nigeria is still in its infant stages but there are certainly 
lessons‘ that could be learnt from a country where there is a centralised regulatory approach 
is followed as well as an active and engaging regulator constantly reviewing regulations.
384
 
It is against this background that an insightful comparative analysis on the enforcement of the 
market abuse regulation will be carried out in this Chapter. Any meaningful lessons that can 
be learnt and innovations that can be recommended for adoption in South Africa will be 
identified. Relevant Nigerian cases and provisions on market abuse will be analysed and 
contrasted with their South African counterparts. 
5.2 Securities regulation in Nigeria 
Authors on the regulation of securities market are of the opinion that securities market 
regulation is principally aimed at protecting investors from unfair, unprofessional and 
improper practices as well as fostering a competitive innovative and efficient market with 
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active and wide investor participation.
385
 Securities regulation is derived from the Companies 
and Allied Matters Decree of 1990 (CAMA) and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
Act (SEC Act).
386
 The Securities and Exchange Commission ('the SEC'), the apex regulator is 
a creature of statute in the Nigerian capital market and lays down the regulatory framework 
for the primary and secondary securities markets.
387
 The SEC Act resembles and derives its 
substance from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
388
 A consequence of the dual 
laws is that there are sometimes unintended overlaps between these statutes. 
The CAMA prescribes the prospectus requirements for public issues and contains the 
regulatory framework for unit trusts and tender offers including takeover bids.
389
 
The Nigerian Investment Promotion Council Decree 16 of 1995 (NIPC) and the Foreign 
Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous) Decree 17 of 1995, abolished the Nigeria 
Enterprises Promotion Decree and the Exchange Control Act to pave the way for direct 
foreign investment in the market.
390
 As a result of these new regulations, the Nigerian 
economy is now open to everybody, Nigerians and non-Nigerians equally in any 
enterprise.
391
 Furthermore participants to the market have equal rights, privileges and 
opportunities to invest in securities in the Nigerian capital market.
392
 The Nigerian Stock 
Exchange dealing members (stockbroking firms) can now accommodate foreign shareholders 
in their equity capital or go into any form of partnership with foreign stockbroking firms: and 
Nigerian companies are now allowed multiple and cross border listings on foreign markets 
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subject to the NSE "Memorandum of Understanding" with such international stock 
exchanges.
393
 
 
5.2.1 The Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission 
As a starting point it is necessary to highlight the regulatory approach followed by Nigeria. It 
is stated that Nigeria follows a so-called Hybrid Approach to financial regulation.
394
 The 
principal regulator for the Nigerian Capital Market is the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) with 
other regulatory support by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Nigeria 
Deposit Insurance Corporation as well as the Nigerian Stock Exchange as a self-regulatory 
organisation.  
The SEC‘s origin dates back to 1962, when an ad hoc consultative and advisory body, known 
as the Capital Issues Committee (CIC), was established under the guidance of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN).
395
 Its mandate was to examine applications from companies seeking 
to raise capital from the capital market and recommend the timing of such issues to prevent 
issues clustering which could overstretch the market‘s capacity.396 As a result the Committee 
operated within the Central Bank of Nigeria unofficially as a capital market consultative and 
advisory body having no regulatory framework.
397
  
Economic activities increased and coupled with the promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprises 
Promotion Decree in 1972, it necessitated the establishment of a body backed by law to 
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regulate capital market activities hence the creation of the Capital Issues Commission in 
terms of the Capital Issues Commission (the Commission) Decree of March 1973, to take 
over the activities of the Capital Issues Committee.
398
  
The Commission had a board of nine members which included a representative of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria who served as Chairman, whereas the other eight members were drawn from 
some Federal Ministries, the industrial and financial sectors of the economy.
399
 In order to 
review the capital markets activities a Financial System Review Committee was set up by the 
federal government to proffer ways of developing the market.
400
 Following the promulgation 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission Decree 71 of 1979, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission was set up to supersede the Capital Issues Commission in 1979.
401
 Its powers 
were broader the its predecessor and included powers to regulate and develop the Nigerian 
capital market, in addition to determining the prices of issues and setting the basis for 
allotment of securities.
402
 The SEC Decree was re-enacted as SEC Decree No. 29 of 1988 
with additional provisions to address observed lapses in the previous arrangement and to 
enable the Commission to pursue its functions more effectively.
403
 
To further enhance the Commission's pursuit of its objective of investor protection, a review 
of the capital market was carried out in 1996 by a seven - man panel headed by Chief Dennis 
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Odife.
404
 The panel's recommendations, further led to the enactment of a new Act known as 
"SEC Decree No. 29 of 1988" that was promulgated on May 26, 1999.
405
 The Act repealed 
the SEC Act of 1988. The new Act was expected to promote a more efficient and virile 
capital market, pivotal to meeting the nation's economic and developmental aspirations.
406
 
The Investment and Securities Act (ISA) was further reviewed, amended and subsequently 
passed into law in 2007. The SEC currently derives its powers from the ISA 29 of 2007.
407
  
The SEC became a member of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) in June 1985.
408
 The IOSCO is a body of Securities Commissions with the goal of 
cooperating in developing, implementing and promoting adherence to internationally 
recognised and consistent standards of securities market regulation.
409
 The Nigerian SEC 
qualified as an Appendix ‗A‘ Signatory to the IOSCO MMOU in 2006 and has continuously 
been benchmarking its market rules and regulations against those of IOSCO, the global 
international standards setter.
410
 As a government agency it is mandated to regulate and 
develop the Nigerian capital market coupled with this it fulfils a large array of functions.
411
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do.html (accessed on 20 January 2014). 
408
 Securities Exchange Commission, available at  
http://www.sec.gov.ng/index.php/bulletins/templates/Modern/styles/files/images/files/CMO%20DATA/what-we-
do.html (accessed on 20 January 2014). 
409
 Securities Exchange Commission, available at  
http://www.sec.gov.ng/index.php/bulletins/templates/Modern/styles/files/images/files/CMO%20DATA/what-we-
do.html (accessed on 20 January 2014). 
410
 Securities Exchange Commission, available at  
http://www.sec.gov.ng/index.php/bulletins/templates/Modern/styles/files/images/files/CMO%20DATA/what-we-
do.html (accessed on 20 January 2014). 
411
 The Commission undertakes various activities in order to protect investors, ensuring that the proper 
registration for securities are followed; conducting surveillance on all exchange traded activities and having 
proper enforcement mechanisms in place.  
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For the purposes of this paper, the focus will be on the surveillance, rulemaking and 
enforcement powers or functions of the SEC. 
5.3 The origins of market abuse regulation 
5.3.1 Insider trading regulation in Nigeria  
Insider trading was broadly defined as "purchases or sales of securities of a company affected 
by or on behalf of a person whose relationship to the company is such that he is likely to have 
access to relevant material information concerning the company not known to the general 
public‖.412 The view on which the prohibition of insider trading is based is that trading should 
be based on equal access to information.
413
  
It is provided for under common law that insider trading only occurs in instances where a 
fiduciary relationship exists between the insider and the other party to the transaction would 
such person who deals with an insider in ignorance of the special facts are able to obtain any 
protections from the law.
414
 
In the 1902 English case of Percival v Wright the Court of Appeal held that a director owed 
no fiduciary duty to a shareholder and therefore could purchase with impunity the latter's 
shares while in possession of favourable confidential information about the company.
415
 As a 
result of the limitations of the common law most jurisdictions in a bid to protect investors 
adequately against insider trading expressly provide in their securities laws for regulations 
and sanctions.
416
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 Omonuwa O Securities Regulation in an Emerging Market: A Comparison between Nigeria and Canada 
(unplublished LLM thesis, University of Manitoba, 2000) 28.   
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 Omonuwa O Securities Regulation in an Emerging Market: A Comparison between Nigeria and Canada 
(unplublished LLM thesis, University of Manitoba, 2000) 28. 
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The practice of insider trading was formally first proscribed under both Chapter V of Pan 
XVII of the CAMA and Regulation 7 in the SEC Act. While the CAMA establishes express 
civil and criminal liability the SEC Act does not.
417
 Regulations 7(2) and 29 of the SEC Act 
stated that insider trading occur when a person or group of persons who are in possession of 
some confidential and price-sensitive information not generally available to the public utilise 
such information to buy or sel1 securities for the benefit of himself itself or any person 
whether knowingly or unknowingly.
418
 
Both section 614 of CAMA and regulation 7(3) of the SEC Act provided a definition for an 
"insider‖.419 
The offence of insider trading applied not only to dealings at a recognised stock exchange: 
but extends to off-market dealings in advertised securities.
420
  
5.3.2 Liability for Insider Trading   
The CAMA provided civil and criminal liability for the contravention of insider trading 
provisions. Section 620 of CAMA provided civil liability for insider trading and in terms of 
this section an insider found guilty is; (a) liable to compensate any person for any direct loss 
                                                          
417
 Regulation 7(2) and 29 of the Securities Exchange Commission Act. 
418
 Regulation 7(2) and 29 of the Securities Exchange Commission Act. 
419
 Section 614 of CAMA and regulation 7(3) of the SEC Act in relevant parts provided that  -    
(a) who is connected with the company during the preceding six months in one of the following 
capacities: 
(i) a director of the company or a related company: 
(ii) an officer of the company or a related company: 
(iii) an employer of the company or a related company: 
(iv) a person in a position involving a professional or business relationship to the company as 
above: 
(v) a shareholder who owns five per cent or more of any class of securities or any person who 
can be deemed to be an agent of any of the above listed persons; and. 
(b) who by virtue of having being connected with the company as mentioned above in (a) above has 
obtained unpublished price-sensitive information in relation to the securities of the company. 
420
 Regulation 63 to the SEC Act further provided that so long as - 
(a) the person who deals in these securities shall qualify as an insider: 
(b) the person shall be an individual not a company: 
(c) the person shall have knowingly been connected with the Company during the preceding six 
months: 
(d) the person shall have obtained the information by virtue of having been connected with the 
Company: 
(e) it shall be reasonable to expect the person not to disclose the information except for the 
performance of his duties: 
(f) the information shall be unpublished price sensitive information in relation to securities. 
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suffered by that person as a result of the transaction unless the information was known or 
with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have been known to that person at the time of 
the transaction; and (b) accountable to the Company for the direct benefit or advantage 
received or receivable by him as a result of the transaction. 
 
The implication of these provisions was that an insider needed not to have been a party to the 
securities transaction. If he counselled another person to deal in the securities he is liable to 
the other party. Section 621 of CAMA provided for criminal liability of either imprisonment 
for two years on conviction for insider trading or a fine of five thousand naira (N5. 000) or 
both such fine and imprisonment. Insider trading was also expressly characterised as a 
manipulative and deceptive act in regulation 7(1)(e).  Under this regulation there were not 
many SEC prosecutions for violations. It can be submitted that it is clear that the enforcement 
capabilities on market abuse/ insider trading regulation on the securities market of Nigeria 
was not well developed and managed by the regulator.
421
 
 
5.4 Market abuse regulation under the auspices of the SEC and the ISA of 2007 
As a result of numerous governance problems within the Nigeria Stock Exchange and the 
media having published of these complaints the SEC in 2010 was mandated to reconsider the 
dealings of the NSE and had to effect changes to its governance. It is important to note that 
both the SEC and the NSE conduct market surveillance, but have not been effective in 
detecting, investigating and prosecuting market abuse, even though certain improvements 
have recently been achieved. This misalignment and defect stems from the fact that no 
regulatory requirements for pre- and post-trade transparency is currently in existence. While 
the securities settlement system effectively addresses the risk of non-delivery of shares, there 
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 Ndanusa SA ‗Role of the Capital Market in National Development‘ Investment and Securities Law Journal 
2006. 
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are no limits for the value of the cash settlement obligations of broker-dealers. In light of the 
IOSCO association the IMF undertook the task of investigation and recommending how these 
defects should be managed.  
 
In a Report published it was highlighted that the regulation should be designed to detect and 
deter manipulation and other unfair trading practices. The regulatory framework prohibiting 
market abuse is in place in Nigeria.
422
 However, the surveillance and enforcement activities 
conducted by the SEC and NSE do not appear to be effective in tackling market abuse, even 
though certain improvements have recently been achieved.
423
 
It is recommended that the regulatory system should ensure an effective and credible use of 
inspection, investigation, surveillance and enforcement powers and implementation of an 
effective compliance program. The regulatory system contains tools for inspection, 
investigation, surveillance and enforcement. On-site inspections are used mainly in relation to 
the issuance of new securities, and to verify compliance with the requirements relating to 
CIS. The SEC has comprehensive enforcement powers, but work remains to be done to 
ensure their effective and consistent use. In practice enforcement tools are primarily used to 
tackle minor issues, mostly delays in filing mandatory reports, rather than major violations of 
securities law and rules. However, the SEC has worked to improve its enforcement 
capabilities, including by obtaining assistance from a foreign regulator. It has also tried to 
                                                          
422
 Principle 36 of the IOSCO Principles,  adapted from the Nigeria: Publication of Financial Sector Assessment 
Program Documentation–– Detailed Assessment of Implementation of IOSCO Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation of May 2013 available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13144.pdf 
(accessed on 15 January 2014). 
423
 Nigeria: Publication of Financial Sector Assessment Program Documentation–– Detailed Assessment of 
Implementation of IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation of May 2013 available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13144.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2014). 
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address its own capacity problems by outsourcing several enforcement cases to law and audit 
firms.
424
 
5.5 Prohibition of market abuse 
In summary the prohibition on market abuse is described in sections 103 and 105–111 of the 
Investments and Securities Act and rules 110 and 133 of the Securities Exchange 
Commission Rules and Regulations and it prohibits various types of market abuse: namely; 
front running a form of insider dealing, market manipulation; disclosure of false or 
misleading statements; use of fraudulent means; and insider dealing.
425
 
 
Directors and other insiders of a company are subject to a requirement to notify their sales 
and purchases in the company‘s shares no later than 48 hours after the transaction (Section 
111 ISA). Under Section 115 of the ISA, the criminal liability for contravening the above 
prohibitions would be a fine of at least ₦500,000 (for individuals) or an amount equivalent to 
double the amount of profit derived or loss averted by the use of the information obtained in 
contravention of any of the above provisions, or imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven 
years. For bodies corporate the minimum fine would be ₦1,000,000. 
In addition, Section 116 of the ISA provides that a person found to be liable must pay 
compensation to any person who suffered a loss as a result of the contravention. The amount 
                                                          
424
 The SEC has a zero tolerance stance against corruption and market abuse has equally been widely 
acknowledged domestically and internationally, encouraging the active participation of international investors 
(who make up about 70 percent of daily buy side trading by value on the Nigerian Stock Exchange) in the 
Nigerian capital markets. This allegation is without basis, and was not mentioned to us by the assessors during 
their mission. The Director General of the Securities and Exchange Commission, since her assumption of duty 
in January 2010, has taken unprecedented steps to eliminate market abuse and corruption from the Nigerian 
capital market. She has not relented in the drive to root out corrupt practices despite push back from vested 
interests. These issues are widely reported [in the local and international media]. She took action to strengthen 
internal controls within the SEC, and has taken steps to initiate a whistle blowing policy.‖ Steps are also being 
taken to establish an Ethics function and recruit an Ethics officer. We are extremely disappointed to note that 
while the final version of the report acknowledges the zero tolerance stance of the Director General against 
corruption, it still retains the weighty and unproven allegation against the Commission.  
425
 Sections 105 -116 of the Investment and Securities Act 2007 in Part T XI (the Act) deals with trading in 
securities and the prohibition of certain activities. Please see Annexure 1 for more detail.  
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of compensation would be the amount of the loss sustained by the person claiming the 
compensation or any other amount as may be determined by the SEC or the IST. 
 
5.6 Market surveillance by the SEC 
The SEC has no automated system to identify unusual transaction on the NSE. It maintains 
permanently two members of its staff on the premises of the NSE that conduct market 
surveillance activities of the SEC and NSE.
426
 At least during the past three and a half years 
(2009 to date), the market abuse cases that the SEC has taken to the IST or forwarded to the 
criminal authorities have been limited to those identified in connection with the work of the 
Joint Task Force with the CBN.
427
 The SEC and NSE have not imposed administrative 
sanctions on market abuse. The SEC and NSE were not able to provide information on 
whether the NSE has referred any market abuse cases to the SEC for further investigation 
during the past few years.
428
 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
It is clear from the above that there are still many gaps in the enforcement of the market 
abuse regulation which is entrenched in the ISA of 2007.  In agreement with the critics it is 
submitted that the regulator‘s powers of investigation and enforcement have been 
underutilised. The reliance that is placed on the reports from capital markets operations and 
exercising its powers of prosecution through administrative proceedings committee and the 
Securities Tribunal does not afford the SEC or the NSE the tools to better regulate the 
                                                          
426
 Nigeria: Publication of Financial Sector Assessment Program Documentation–– Detailed Assessment of 
Implementation of IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation of May 2013 available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13144.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2014). 
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 Nigeria: Publication of Financial Sector Assessment Program Documentation–– Detailed Assessment of 
Implementation of IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation of May 2013 available at 
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practice of market abuse.
429
 Similar to the Financial Markets Act of South Africa, the 
Investment and Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Commission Rules and 
regulations need to be reviewed in order to provide the appropriate guidance around 
enforcement especially at the lowest levels and that is with broker deals. Unlike South Africa, 
the SEC and the NSE need to ensure that it upskills the current market surveillance 
capabilities. As a shortcoming of the current regulation, it needs to clearly provide guidance 
on what is required for market abuse surveillance and not just market surveillance as this 
could mean other types of monitoring. It could in all likelihood include market abuse 
surveillance together with trader limit surveillance, dealer mandate surveillance, and 
operational risk surveillance. However, guidance from both the NSE and SEC needs to be 
obtained in order for capital markets operators to effectively manage the practice of market 
abuse.    
 
It would not be necessary for both the NSE and the SEC to invent or struggle with this 
process. By leveraging of cross border regulatory developments and guidance from 
regulatory guidelines on this matter it would just be a case of personalising such strategies to 
be suitable to the capital and securities market of Nigeria.
430
  
 
The CBN, SEC and NSE should be commended for their good collaborative nature in 
regulating the financial institutions and banking sector. Furthermore, for being proactive and 
                                                          
429
 Blankson A ‗Promoting market integrity and investor protection in Nigeria‘ available at 
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3110460/Promoting-market-integrity-and-investor-protection-in-Nigeria.html 
(accessed on 20 March 2015). 
430
 The reviewers in the Nigeria: Publication of Financial Sector Assessment Program Documentation–– 
Detailed Assessment of Implementation of IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation of May 
2013 available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13144.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2014) 
provides evidence that the SEC has already attempted the cross border cooperation with counterparties in order 
to improve its enforcement capabilities. It has obtained assistance from a foreign regulator to build its 
enforcement capacity and has outsourced several enforcement actions. Specifically, the collaboration with the 
Joint Task Force (JTF) in 2010. The JTF included private law firms and an audit firm. It was set up to identify 
deviations from the ISA and relevant SEC Rules and Regulations. 
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having issued a Code of Conduct for Capital Market Operators and their Employees to 
address failure of compliance with the conduct of business requirements, this is a sanction 
provisioned code. The NSE should be commended for creating a surveillance arm to carry 
out daily and routine surveillance of focused trading activities and the detection of market 
abuse practices such as false trading, market manipulation, rigging and the guarding against 
the circulation of price sensitive information.
431
 The SEC should be commended for 
instituting an enforcement and compliance department and the implementation of detailed 
rules to regulate the activities of the capital market operators.   
 
The reviewers
432
 are however; wary of the SEC‘s compliance procedures433 and its 
enforcement system as it does not in practice appear to be effective. They provide several 
reasons in support of this finding. Criticisms were, that it was not possible to confirm whether 
there is a proper audit trail of all the cases that the various SEC departments have investigated 
and that have then possibly been passed on to the Enforcement & Compliance Department 
and from there possibly to the criminal process. The involved departments do not seem to 
communicate directly, but the communication takes place through the senior management. 
Secondly, onsite inspections are currently not done on a routine basis, and there have been 
severe delays in the decisions to take action in potential enforcement cases. 
It is clear from the above review the legislative framework between South Africa and Nigeria 
is differently structured. South Africa provides a more intrusive and extended market abuse 
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 Blankson A ‗Promoting market integrity and investor protection in Nigeria‘ available at 
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3110460/Promoting-market-integrity-and-investor-protection-in-Nigeria.html 
(accessed on 20 March 2015). 
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 Nigeria: Publication of Financial Sector Assessment Program Documentation–– Detailed Assessment of 
Implementation of IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation of May 2013 available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13144.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2014). 
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 The reviewers in the Nigeria: Publication of Financial Sector Assessment Program Documentation–– 
Detailed Assessment of Implementation of IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation of May 
2013 available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13144.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2014)  
reports that the SEC requires market surveillance mechanisms that permit an audit of the execution and trading 
of all transactions made on the NSE. 
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regulation, whereas Nigeria pronounces on the various forms of insider trading or market 
manipulation practices. The next Chapter will provide review of the underlying research that 
was undertaken by the researcher. The author will provide recommendations to the current 
gaps in the regulation and enforcement of the market abuse legislative framework in South 
Africa.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE 
ENFORCEMENT AND REGULATION APPROACH OF MARKET ABUSE IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
6.1 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
The current regulatory framework on market abuse has to a certain extent addressed the 
concerns raised by the investor on the street, namely fair markets, market transparency and 
investor confidence. It however, still faces serious challenges regarding the enforcement and 
adequate monitoring of such regulation.  It is crucial to once again highlight that the financial 
markets are of central importance to the economic system, finding appropriate regulation is 
therefore crucial.
434
 Market abuse is one of the greatest threats to the well-being of the 
financial markets and therefore a harmonised regulatory approach is required to address the 
evil of market abuse a practice that dominates trading in financial instruments.
435
  
This Chapter seeks to recommend possible solutions to the market abuse problem in South 
Africa. It is hoped that such recommendations will help the legislature, regulatory bodies and 
market operators to succeed in its endeavours to curb the practice of market abuse.  
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
A number of recommendations aimed at resolving the inadequacies in the market abuse 
regulation, enforcement and monitoring capabilities are made with suggestions as to how 
these recommendations can be best implemented and utilised to restrict market abuse and 
related practices. 
a) The author recommends that the FSB of South Africa should collaborate with cross 
border regulators in order to improve and manage market abuse regulation. 
Regulatory harmonisation will be a crucial step in order to combat the effects of market abuse 
practice on the financial markets of South Africa.
436
 The market abuse regime is not just 
                                                          
434
 Soderstrom R ‗Regulating Market Manipulation – An Approach to designing regulatory principles‘ available 
at http://uu.diva-portal.org accessed on 14 April 2014. 
435
 To date the FSB is investigating 15 possible cases of market abuse – possible insider trading or market 
manipulation investigations as 23 September 2015. Information obtained from 
https://www.fsb.co.za/NewsLibrary/Report%20by%20the%20Directorate%20of%20Market%20Abuse.pdf 
accessed on 30 September 2015. 
436
 FSB Annual Report (2011) at 99-101 and the FSB Annual Report (2013) at 128-130 which, inter alia, show 
the new, ongoing and completed investigations of market abuse cases between 2011 and 2013, respectively and 
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aimed at deterring the behaviour of market participants though criminalising the offence, but 
it is also aimed at apprehending behaviour that undermines the confidence in the market 
which is generally below reasonable expected standards. Cross border cooperation is required 
in order to successfully investigate and prosecute cross-border market abuse cases in South 
Africa or other states. A number of big corporations in South Africa have international 
presence and in some instances their main business are housed in foreign jurisdictions which 
also impacts the economy of South Africa.
437
 There is also various gaps in South Africa‘s 
current regulation on market abuse as it does not provide for all forms of market abuse 
practices such as high frequency trading, short selling, credit default swaps and front running, 
as it is not expressly and statutorily outlawed under the Financial Markets Act.
438
 
The enforcement of the insider trading prohibition involves many regulatory bodies in other 
jurisdictions, this is however only the responsibility, of the FSB and its functionaries.
439
 To 
date it is submitted that it appears that there have been little to no cooperation and 
coordination between the courts and the FSB and its committees in combatting market abuse. 
Other relevant regulatory bodies in South Africa such as the Bond Exchange of South Africa 
(BESA), the Competition Commission of South Africa and other self-regulatory 
organisations should become more involved in complimenting the efforts of the FSB.
440
 This 
will help the public regulator (FSB) to raise adequate resources for effective enforcement of 
the insider trading prohibition. 
 
It is further submitted that as a member of the G20 and IOSCO, South Africa should place 
more reliance and cooperation efforts to work with these two associations which are 
instrumental in setting the international guidelines, policies and processes for financial 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Directorate of Market Abuse ―Report by the Directorate of Market Abuse‖ FSB Press Release 2 December 
2014, which indicates that about 19 cases of market abuse were investigated by the DMA between March 2007 
and September 2014. Nonetheless, only one case out of the 19 cases of market abuse was successfully 
investigated and completed while the rest of the cases are still ongoing.  See also Chapter 3 of this dissertation 
for more information as to why it is important for cross border harmonisation and cooperation between 
regulators. 
437
 All of the major big banks in South Africa have operations across the African continent, Europe and even the 
United States of America and China – Standard Bank, Barclays Bank, Nedbank Limited and First National Bank 
Limited. Various international banks and investment companies are also operating in South Africa. 
438
 See sections 78; 80; 81 and 82 of the FMA. 
439
 See Chapter 3 of this dissertation for more information. The DMA was initially established as the Insider 
Trading Directorate (ITD) in terms of s 12 of the Insider Trading Act and its main mandate was limited to 
investigating insider trading violations in South Africa.  See also section 85 of the Financial Markets Act for an 
outline of the current functions of the DMA.   
440
 The Competition has become more intrusive into the affairs of certain market players in the FX derivatives 
and currency markets of South Africa as a result of the FX rigging probe internationally – during August and 
September 2015. 
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stability. South Africa has been following a light touch approach
441
 maintaining the balance 
between the enforcement of the prohibition and guarding against limiting trading practices.
442
  
The United Kingdom on the other hand follows an approach to ensure that its investigation 
and enforcement capabilities have been tightened and that the regulation on the securities is 
well developed in order to meet technological and market trends.
443
  
In order to further harmonise the regulatory scheme of South Africa, the regulators together 
with the legislature is urged to relook the current framework in regard to the market 
infrastructure available to meet the requirements of the regulation; sophistication of the 
corporate community; trading volume and client size as well as the IT infrastructure. These 
costs perspectives will allow the regulator and legislature to craft regulation that will best 
meet the current ambience of our financial markets as well as cost perspectives.
444
 
Regulatory harmonisation can also be achieved through cooperating efforts in order to detect, 
investigate, monitor and report market abuse incidents or case. This will be achieved through 
dual regulatory inspections – on or off site inspections and market surveillance.  
b) The requirement to educate and develop competencies across South Africa 
The FSB should also equip its staff capability and competencies and this will also be enabled 
through a collaborative approach and intervention.
445
 Certainly if such expertise lies cross 
border, it is recommended that it be utilised in order to facilitate skills development, 
cultivating local specialist that will provide the necessary guidance to corporates in the 
financial markets. 
 
c) The author recommends that the FSB of South Africa should place more reliance and 
provide guidance on enforcement through the deployment of market surveillance and 
market abuse surveillance in order to tighten the anti-market abuse regime. 
                                                          
441
 The author refers to this as an approach of the regulation not to hamper trading in the financial markets with 
strict and intrusive regulation, but to rather balance the enforcement of regulation and prohibition of trading 
through strict market abuse regulation. 
442
 See sections 78, 80, 81 and 82 of the FMA. 
443
 The new regulation on Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, ESMA and the FCA mandate provides 
clear guidance on its approach.  
444
 The author is of the opinion that regulators should consider IT infrastructure as well as general infrastructure 
aspects in South Africa when drafting new regulation. 
445
 The Banking Association of South Africa (BASA) is the ideal platform to discuss the prospects of further 
education and training on market abuse. 
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It is important for organisations, the exchanges and regulatory bodies to enforce and promote 
the deployment of pre and post trade surveillance
446
 solutions and capabilities. It is noted that 
the goals of market surveillance are primarily two-fold.
447
 On the one hand it is to ensure that 
trading in the given market is fair and orderly.
448
 To achieve this, market surveillance is 
undertaken to identify rule breaches, erroneous activity, an algorithm that malfunctions or 
general ―fat finger‖ errors. It is also used to identify deliberate submissions of excessive 
numbers of orders and cancellations or disruptions to orderly trading like the ―flash crash‖ of 
May 2010.
449
 Such surveillance would be expected to provide the market authority with 
sufficient tools to halt the given problem in a timely fashion and to provide the information 
necessary for a Market Authority to understand within a reasonable time the underlying 
causes of a material market disruption.
450
 
The other form of market surveillance is undertaken for market abuse purposes. In South 
Africa the JSE also currently provides this oversight. This includes the ability to detect 
possible instances or patterns of market abuse and to investigate referrals from market 
participants and the public. It is either undertaken in real-time through the utilization of alert 
functionalities built into surveillance systems to help flag suspicious activity or post trade 
surveillance that occurs trading plus 1 day.
451
 Surveillance work that focuses on market abuse 
centres on gathering the key elements of the information, including an audit trail, necessary to 
investigate and bring cases. The following principles provide clear guidance as to what the 
surveillance capability should entail -  
 Principle 10: The regulator should have comprehensive inspection, investigation and 
surveillance powers.  
 Principle 12: The regulatory system should ensure an effective and credible use of 
inspection, investigation, surveillance and enforcement powers and implementation of 
an effective compliance program. 
                                                          
446
 Pre-trade surveillance programs can be employed to validate trade instructions, ensure trading thresholds are 
not breached, and prevent trades being conducted on restricted instruments. Post-trade surveillance can monitor 
for front-running, suitability, best-execution and regulatory transaction reporting. 
447
 See the IOSCO principles. Market surveillance is a key component to attaining the IOSCO objectives and 
principles of securities regulation. 
448
 This is currently executed by the JSE Surveillance department.  
449
 See the IOSCO principles. Market surveillance is a key component to attaining the IOSCO objectives and 
principles of securities regulation. 
450
 See the IOSCO principles. Market surveillance is a key component to attaining the IOSCO objectives and 
principles of securities regulation. 
451
 That is non-real-time analysis, such as the running of periodic reports, or trend analysis to help detect unusual 
patterns of behaviour over the period of seconds, hours, days or even weeks. The investigation of alerts and 
allegations of abuse in response to tip-offs and referrals is similarly undertaken on a non-real-time basis. 
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 Principle 33: The establishment of trading systems including securities exchanges 
should be subject to regulatory authorization and oversight.  
 Principle 34: There should be ongoing regulatory supervision of exchanges and 
trading systems, which should aim to ensure that the integrity of trading is maintained 
through fair and equitable rules that strike an appropriate balance between the 
demands of different market participants. 
 Principle 36: Regulation should be designed to detect and deter manipulation and 
other unfair trading practices.  
 Principle 37: Regulation should aim to ensure the proper management of large 
exposures, default risk and market disruption.  
 
The main focus of trade surveillance is to prevent market abuse and market manipulation, 
which can severely damage a firm‘s reputation. Since the financial crisis, one of the many 
efforts by regulators to improve market transparency and investor confidence has been to 
improve trade surveillance, for example, in the area of pre-trade surveillance. Therefore 
regulators should mandate all financial firms, investment companies, stock brokers and 
exchanges to perform post trade surveillance by monitoring the trading activities of 
employees in order to identify potential violations such as insider or speculative trading.
452
  
It is also crucial that compliance procedures set up by the financial institutions should be 
robust and pre-emptive to help detect and capture any rogue trading and inside trading 
activities.  
d) The author recommends that the FSB of South Africa should manage the practice of 
market abuse control through investing its efforts in embedding and grooming the 
compliance functions‘ in order to assist in the  enforcement of the market abuse 
regime 
A key focus is placed on the compliance function to enforce best practices. It is submitted 
that the compliance function in any jurisdiction holds and manages the relationship with the 
regulator. A compliance officer has the responsibility to advise management and the board of 
all regulatory developments that may impact the organisation and what are the consequences 
of such non-compliance.  Therefore the compliance function is best suited to provide 
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 Currently there are about four or five exchanges that are performing a surveillance function and have 
sophisticated solutions for this purpose, this includes amongst others South Africa – the JSE; Kenya (Nairobi 
Stock Exchange) and Nigeria (Nigeria Stock Exchange) on the African continent. 
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guidance to firms in establishing their internal policies and procedures and/or Codes of 
Conduct. A market that is free from manipulation is fundamental to fostering stability. 
Importantly, each market participant is obligated to refrain from market abuse. Regulated 
firms are also responsible for establishing a culture and practices that prevent, detect and 
deter market abuse. Therefore the author recommends that the compliance function should be 
mandated to ensure that market abuse practices are regulated and prevented in the 
organisation through conducting market abuse surveillance and compliance monitoring on the 
principles of the FMA. 
 
e) The author recommends that more consideration and concerted effort should be made 
to improve market abuse regulation in the development of the new twin peaks 
regulation in South Africa that will add to international best practice on the topic of 
financial markets regulation. 
 
There has been a strong emphasis on coordination and cooperation of financial sector 
regulators by many academics, in line with the overall intention of consolidating and 
streamlining regulation to promote better outcomes in the financial sector. South Africa 
appears to be in the process of implementing a regulatory framework in which a dedicated 
market conduct authority will underpin a stronger and more effective consumer protection 
framework for the financial services sector. The FSR Bill sets out primary objectives for a 
newly-created FSCA to best ensure that market conduct regulation works together with 
prudential regulation to support financial stability and protect financial customers. These 
objectives are -fair treatment of financial customers, efficiency and integrity of the financial 
system and financial literacy and capability. 
This is a positive approach, however it should be noted that little emphasis and development 
has been placed on the regulation of market abuse within this new framework. It is important 
that market abuse regulation be placed as a high priority and that efforts should be gathered to 
combat this practice. 
f) The government and all relevant stakeholders should be fully involved and be 
supportive in relation to the regulation and enforcement of the insider trading 
prohibition. 
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Consequently only the FSB is directly involved in the enforcement of the market abuse 
prohibition.
453
 The researcher therefore recommends that government should put in place 
additional specialized units or courts, or regional offices to assist with the enforcement, 
detection and investigation of market abuse practices and be directly involved in the actual 
enforcement in the courts of the provisions relating to civil liability.  
 
As a result the FSB would then only be responsible for monitoring market tendencies that 
may point towards insider trading or market manipulation activity and engage other bodies to 
investigate, prosecute and litigate. The FSB, with the assistance of the DMA and the EC, 
should concentrate on the initial monitoring function, out of court settlements where justified 
and administration of claims by the aggrieved investors. They should also focus their efforts 
on developing a culture of fair markets, developing its own competencies and educating 
society
454
 on the effects of market abuse. 
 
g) The policy makers should consider developing an adequate and effective corporate 
ethics culture that will be observed in companies and financial markets of South 
Africa. 
 
This relates to market professionals, such as brokers, financial analysts, lawyers, accountants 
and also publishing and printing companies in South Africa. It would be misleading to argue 
that these persons have nothing to do with the regulation of insider trading. These role players 
often have access to unpublished price-sensitive information in the course of executing their 
duties and ample opportunity to engage in insider trading activities. Administrative sanctions 
such as forfeiture of licences, suspension from profession or disqualification to serve as 
directors should also in this context, be considered by the legislature to promote such a strong 
corporate and professional ethics culture. 
 
Furthermore, the researcher recommends effective programmes based on best organizational 
culture of companies and other institutions. Such programmes could include developing 
effective anti-corruption measures and strategies, proper record keeping of compliance and 
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 Chitimira H ‗An overview analysis of selected challenges in the enforcement of the prohibition of insider 
trading and market manipulation in the European Union and South African regulatory frameworks‘ (2015) 19 
Law, Democracy and Development 94. 
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 Society is a reference to the investor on the street, brokerages, financial institutions and other regulatory 
bodies in South Africa. 
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adequate and effective auditing. The researcher recommends that the company secretary 
should be specifically responsible to the company for compliance with insider trading 
legislation and the internal regulatory framework of the company. 
 
h) Stricter requirements for financial institutions to develop and manage internal policies  
 
As a result of weak regulatory cooperation on the African continent it is imperative that as a 
leading regulated country, South Africa should implement stricter compliance requirements 
for financial institutions to manage compliance risks, more specifically market abuse. Across 
the African Union Member States, South Africa is the only country with a strong framework 
and it should therefore seek other avenues of enforcing compliance.  Having no legislation, 
that is similar to the EU Market Abuse Directive which has been specifically enacted to 
harmonise the enforcement of the securities and market abuse laws in EU, so too should 
South Africa develop such regulation borrowing from countries with stronger regulation.  
 
i) Increasing regulatory interaction and onsite investigations, inquiries and reviews\ 
 
Nigeria is a market leader in being very intrusive into the operations of its financial 
institutions. The Central Bank annually conducts 3 to 4 inspections and general engages 
banks, financial institutions and investment companies on a monthly to quarterly basis. The 
general focus is suspicious transactions and exchange control enquiries. There have been 
little or no inquiries into market abuse. Therefore as a market leader on the African continent 
it is crucial for South Africa to become more intrusive into to the dealings of large market 
players such as the big banks and brokerages dealing in securities trading on exchange. Such 
a cultural will not only curb market abuse but it will always assist in enhancing investor 
confidence, free and fairer markets and also inspire other regulatory bodies on the continent 
to focus more attention on curbing the effects of market abuse. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
It can be said with no doubt that the enactment of the FMA has been a positive attempt by the 
legislature to improve the capability and enforcement of the market abuse provisions in South 
Africa. Coupled with this, various regulatory and enforcement efforts were made in an effort 
to enhance the combatting of market abuse practices in South African financial markets. Like 
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the EU, South Africa has introduced over the decades competent anti-market abuse 
legislation, committees, commissions and regulatory bodies were introduced from time to 
time to discourage all unscrupulous persons from indulging in market abuse and other illicit 
trading activities in South Africa, however it is recommended that the existing legislation be 
revised comprehensively with regard to the recommendations made in this research. It is 
hoped that this dissertation will make a significant contribution towards banning market 
abuse practices in South Africa. 
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